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Until recently, Supreme Court precedent dictated that a person waives 
their Fourth Amendment rights in information they disclose to another 
party.  The Court reshaped this doctrine in Carpenter v. United States, 
establishing that the Fourth Amendment protects cell phone location data 
even though it is revealed to others.  The Court emphasized that consumers 
had little choice but to disclose their data, because cell phone use is virtually 
inescapable in modern society. 
In the wake of Carpenter, many scholars and lower courts have endorsed 
inescapability as an important factor for determining Fourth Amendment 
rights.  Under this approach, surveillance that people cannot feasibly escape 
receives more Fourth Amendment scrutiny, while surveillance that can be 
avoided receives less, or none. 
This Article offers the first systematic analysis of inescapability in Fourth 
Amendment law.  It challenges the prevailing wisdom that inescapability is a 
desirable or workable basis for Fourth Amendment protection.  Inescapability 
does not provide a conceptually coherent standard for courts to apply.  It 
incentivizes consumers to forego beneficial technologies, creating substantial 
social harms.  It fails to adequately protect the most sensitive forms of 
personal information.  It creates doctrinal confusion and ignores established 
precedents that contradict the inescapability model.  Moreover, 
inescapability analysis elides individual differences—technologies that are 
avoidable for most people may be unavoidable for others, including the 
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disabled, the poor, and other disadvantaged populations. 
Inescapability threatens to limit privacy rights to a narrow set of digital 
technologies while making a mess of Fourth Amendment doctrine.  This 
Article analyzes these issues in depth and explores several alternatives for 
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Many modern technologies gather information about their users.1  
These technologies are often hard to avoid.  Computers, the internet, and cell 
phones are ubiquitous and play an important role in most people’s lives.2  Yet 
many technologies are far less essential.  Consider the Furbo, an interactive 
camera device that allows pet owners to remotely launch treats at their pets 
by pressing a button on their cell phones.3  The Furbo may be useful for pet 
owners, but owning one is not a necessity of modern life. 
This distinction between avoidable and unavoidable technologies arose 
recently in a landmark Fourth Amendment case involving cell phone location 
data.  In Carpenter v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that 
government officials must get  a warrant before obtaining cell phone location 
data that would allow them to track users’ movements over time.4  The Court 
found that people have no choice but to disclose their location data, because 
cell phone use is virtually “inescapable” in modern life.5  Accordingly, users 
 
1 See, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth Amendment of 
Effects, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 805, 812–18 (2016). 
2 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018) (discussing the central 
importance of cell phones to modern life); Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 
(2014) (noting that cell phones are a “pervasive and insistent part of daily life”); 
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735–36 (2017) (describing the 
importance of the internet and social media to core First Amendment activity). 
3 FURBO DOG CAMERA, https://shopus.furbo.com/ [https://perma.cc/GYZ5-
GWZJ?type=image] (last visited July 28, 2020).  The Furbo also enables owners to 
communicate with their pets via a two-way audio system.  Id.  The latest version of the 
Furbo can capture videos whenever pet activity is detected and store those videos in the 
cloud.  Id.  It analyzes these videos using artificial intelligence and sends text alerts to 
owners regarding their pets’ activities.  Id.  The Furbo records video and sound from the 
inside of owners’ homes on a “24 hours event-based” protocol, potentially capturing 
sensitive data about the owner and their activities inside their home.  See id.  It also has 
several benefits, including the ability to monitor one’s pet and to detect intruders or other 
emergencies.  Id. 
4 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221. 
5 Id. at 2223.  Moreover, cell phone data is transmitted automatically when a phone is in 
use, without any input or permission from the user, making it impossible for even 
sophisticated users to escape the disclosure of their information.  Id. at 2220. 
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do not voluntarily give up their information—and they retain a Fourth 
Amendment right in their cell phone location data.6  The Court also reasoned 
that cell phone tracking reveals sensitive personal information and collects a 
great deal of data about people’s lives.7 
Carpenter was a huge development in Fourth Amendment law.8  For the 
first time, it declared that the Fourth Amendment protected location data 
even if that data had been exposed to another party.9  This raised the 
possibility that other forms of personal data disclosed to private parties might 
be protected as well.10  This category includes nearly every form of digital 
information: websurfing data, emails, texts, search terms, app usage, video 
and audio recordings, medical and fitness information, smart home data, and 
much more.11  Whether such data is ultimately protected may depend on 
whether its disclosure is “inescapable.”12 
In the wake of Carpenter, many lower courts have applied an 
inescapability standard, attempting to determine whether the digital 
surveillance at issue in a case was avoidable.13  Several scholars have endorsed 
 
6 Id. at 2220. 
7 Id. at 2217–18. 
8 See generally Paul Ohm, The Many Revolutions of Carpenter, 32 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 357, 
358 (2019) (contending that Carpenter represents a sea change in Fourth Amendment law 
governing new technologies). 
9 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (“Given the unique nature of cell phone location records, 
the fact that the information is held by a third party does not by itself overcome the user’s 
claim to Fourth Amendment protection.”); cf. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 721 
(1984) (finding no Fourth Amendment search when agents used a beeper to monitor a 
truck on public highways); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983) (“A 
person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his movements from one place to another,” because he “voluntarily conveyed to 
anyone who wanted to look the fact that he was travelling over particular roads in a 
particular direction.”). 
10 See Ohm, supra note 8, at 378–385. 
11 See id.; Matthew Tokson, The Emerging Principles of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 88 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020). 
12 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223. 
13 See, e.g., United States v. Hood, 920 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 2019); Naperville Smart 
Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 900 F.3d 521, 527 (7th Cir. 2018); United States 
v. Kidd, 394 F. Supp. 3d 357, 358–59, 365–66 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); United States v. Maclin, 
393 F. Supp. 3d 701, 708 (N.D. Ohio 2019); United States v. Diggs, 385 F. Supp. 3d 
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inescapability as an important factor for determining Fourth Amendment 
protection, along with the revealing and extensive nature of the surveillance 
at issue.14  Others have argued that inescapability should be an absolute 
requirement for the Fourth Amendment to apply.15  While disagreements 
remain, early interpretations of Carpenter generally place inescapability at the 
center of Fourth Amendment privacy going forward.16 
This Article challenges the idea that inescapability is a coherent or 
normatively defensible basis for Fourth Amendment protection.  
Inescapability has several theoretical and practical flaws that existing accounts 
of the concept have overlooked.  This Article offers the first detailed analysis 
of this new concept, exploring its theoretical underpinnings, its doctrinal 
structure, and its policy implications.  It finds that the use of inescapability 
as a Fourth Amendment standard would lead to serious administrability 
problems and the underprotection of privacy in personal electronic data.  The 
Article examines these issues in depth and interrogates the prevailing wisdom 
that inescapability is a viable model for Fourth Amendment law. 
Inescapability is conceptually ambiguous.  It cannot be taken literally, 
because virtually all information disclosures are escapable with sufficient 
effort.  Internet data, for instance, can often be kept from third-party 
observation by using widely available software or by opting out of 
information collection.17  Consumers can also bargain for greater privacy 
 
648, 660–61 (N.D. Ill. 2019); United States v. Tolbert, No. 14-3761-JCH, 2019 WL 
2006464 (D.N.M. May 7, 2019); United States v. Therrien, No. 2:18-CR-00085, 2019 
WL 1147479 (D. Vt. Mar. 13, 2019); State v. Martinez, 570 S.W.3d 278, 288 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 2019); State v. Leonard, 923 N.W.2d 52, 57 (Minn. Ct. App. 2019).  For 
additional cases and discussion, see infra subpart I.D. 
14 See, e.g., Aaron L. Dalton, Carpenter v. United States: A New Era for Protecting Data 
Generated on Personal Technology, or a Mere Caveat?, 20 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ONLINE 1, 23 
(2018); Ohm, supra note 8, at 376–78. 
15 See Orin S. Kerr, Implementing Carpenter, in THE DIGITAL FOURTH AMENDMENT 
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 20), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3301257 
[https://perma.cc/RUR4-2JBU]. 
16 See infra subparts I.C–I.D; see also Evan Caminker, Location Tracking and Digital Data: 
Can Carpenter Build a Stable Privacy Doctrine?, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 411, 451 (noting 
residual uncertainty about the role of inescapability while emphasizing its importance). 
17 See infra notes 100–104 and accompanying text. 
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protections, at least in theory.18  Even when applied nonliterally, an 
inescapability standard puts individuals asserting privacy rights at a strategic 
disadvantage.19 
Further, a more nuanced inescapability standard would be difficult to 
apply accurately.  Courts could try to determine precisely how escapable a 
given technology is, granting protection whenever avoiding the technology is 
sufficiently difficult.  But this would be an ambiguous and fact-heavy inquiry, 
with results that would change over time as technologies and social practices 
change.  Such a standard would make adjudication more costly and less 
predictable while offering little offsetting benefit.20  Adding to the confusion, 
it would also conflict with longstanding precedents still in force.21 
The society-wide scope of the inescapability inquiry also threatens to 
overlook individual differences among users.  A technology that most people 
can easily escape may be inescapable for others.  For example, while 
ride-sharing apps might be avoidable for most people, they may be 
indispensable for disabled persons or those who cannot afford a car and lack 
access to public transit.22  Failing to take individual differences into account 
is a serious flaw in existing concepts of inescapability.  Yet varying Fourth 
Amendment protection among individuals based on their unique 
circumstances is not viable either—it would create massive administrability 
problems for courts and legal actors. 
Concerns about inescapability extend beyond these conceptual and 
practical issues.  Perhaps most seriously, an inescapability standard creates 
socially harmful incentives.  It motivates consumers to avoid escapable 
technologies that collect information, lest they lose their privacy rights.  But 
those technologies are often beneficial, and incentivizing people to avoid 
them creates substantial social harm.  Optional technologies such as smart 
devices, dating apps, and navigation services can confer potentially enormous 
 
18 See infra notes 105–107 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 108–109 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 118–120 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra subpart II.D. 
22 See infra section II.A.3. 
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benefits on their users.23  Deterring consumers from using such technologies 
would be disastrous.  Yet if consumers continue to use these technologies, 
they may face comprehensive government surveillance unchecked by the 
Fourth Amendment. 
This is especially concerning because inescapability fails to protect many 
forms of sensitive information.  Optional technologies frequently capture 
intimate forms of data.  Internet connected beds, wearable devices, and other 
“smart” items can record and transmit deeply personal details about people’s 
lives.24  DNA analysis services, dating apps, and other optional services can 
obtain sensitive information about an individual’s biological and 
psychological traits.25  An inescapability standard may leave this data exposed, 
while often requiring a warrant for far less sensitive data.26  Inescapability fails 
to draw a normatively defensible line between protected and unprotected 
forms of digital information. 
In light of these issues, this Article examines several alternative 
approaches that avoid reliance on inescapability.  When the Supreme Court 
addresses the Fourth Amendment again, it might overtly reject inescapability 
and embrace factors like the intimacy, amount, and cost of surveillance, 
which find ample support in prior Fourth Amendment cases.27  Or, it might 
adopt a more novel approach.  In recent years, scholars have proposed looking 
to positive law, survey data, historical practice, or normative balancing in 
order to draw the boundaries of the Fourth Amendment.  This Article 
analyzes these approaches and finds that most of them offer a more coherent 
and protective standard than inescapability. 
In the meantime, lower courts applying Carpenter can plausibly 
 
23 See infra subpart II.B.  Even the Furbo dog camera has substantially benefitted 
homeowners and their pets in some situations, including break-ins and medical 
emergencies.  Furbo’s Barking Alerts Save Dogs from Fires and Gas Leaks, FURBO, 
https://shopus.furbo.com/pages/save-dog-lives [https://perma.cc/MP6Q-
GE7M?type=image] (last visited July 28, 2020). 
24 See infra notes 155–158 and accompanying text.  
25 See infra notes 140–144, 158 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra subpart II.C. 
27 See Tokson, supra note 11, at 13–26 (analyzing the more universal principles of intimacy 
of information sought, amount of information sought, and cost of surveillance). 
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minimize inescapability, while focusing on the other important factors 
identified in Carpenter—the revealing and extensive nature of surveillance.28  
Indeed, some lower courts have already begun to do so.29  This interpretive 
process can help shape Supreme Court doctrine and point the way toward a 
more effective standard for Fourth Amendment protection.30 
Part I of the Article describes the doctrinal and theoretical foundations 
of inescapability.  It discusses the Carpenter case and examines how scholars 
and lower courts have endorsed inescapability as a determinant of the Fourth 
Amendment’s scope.  Part II challenges the premises of inescapability, 
detailing the conceptual, practical, and normative weaknesses of an 
inescapability standard.  It also describes the doctrinal conflicts and the 
socially harmful incentives that inescapability would create.  Part III analyzes 
several potential alternative regimes for setting the boundaries of the Fourth 
Amendment.  It offers a roadmap for lower courts to minimize the use of 
inescapability when applying Carpenter and explores how both courts and 
scholars can effectively shape Fourth Amendment law going forward. 
       
I. THE RISE OF INESCAPABILITY 
This Part tracks the emergence of inescapability as a determinant of 
Fourth Amendment protection.  Doctrinal concepts of privacy and voluntary 
disclosure laid the foundations for inescapability.  The Supreme Court then 
analyzed inescapability in a landmark case involving cell phone tracking.  
Many scholars and lower courts have since adopted the concept of 
inescapability in applying the Fourth Amendment to new surveillance 
technologies.  This Part examines each of these developments in turn. 
A. The Third-Party Doctrine 
The Supreme Court has held that a Fourth Amendment search occurs 
 
28 See infra subpart III.A. 
29 See infra note 93 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 197–206. 
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when a government official physically intrudes on certain types of property31 
or violates a person’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.”32  The Court has 
not clearly explained what makes an expectation of privacy reasonable, and it 
has given several conflicting interpretations of the standard.33  It has been 
relatively clear, however, in addressing data that individuals reveal to other 
parties.  In the 1970s, the Court developed the “third-party doctrine,” which 
provides that a person waives their Fourth Amendment rights in information 
they voluntarily disclose to a third party.34  For example, the Fourth 
Amendment does not apply to the phone numbers that a person dials, 
because they have disclosed those numbers to the phone company.35  The 
 
31 See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 7–10 (2013); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 
404-06 (2012).  The physical intrusion test has so far added little to the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test, and the Supreme Court cases where it has been used may have 
come out similarly under Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  Jardines, 569 U.S. at 
12–16 (Kagan, J., concurring); Jones, 565 U.S. at 418–31 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).   
32 This standard is often referred to as the Katz test, having first appeared in Justice 
Harlan’s concurrence in 1967’s Katz v. United States.  389 U.S. at 361.  The Court has not 
fully defined the concept of a reasonable expectation of privacy, and scholars have 
interpreted the standard in different ways.  See Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth 
Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 508 (2007) (positing that the Court applies 
multiple, conflicting models of the Fourth Amendment in different cases); Tokson, supra 
note 11, at 12 (contending that the Court applies an intuitive model of Fourth 
Amendment searches that looks to the intimacy, amount, and cost of the surveillance 
practice at issue). 
33 Kerr, supra note 32.  In some cases, the Court looks to the probability that a person’s 
privacy will be violated. Id. at 508–10.  In others, it looks to other sources of law, to the 
private nature of the thing searched, or to the policy implications of the surveillance.  Id. at 
512–22. 
34 Cases holding that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to statements made to an 
undercover officer predate the reasonable expectation of privacy test, although the third-
party doctrine itself was not established in its full form until the 1970s.  See Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (concluding that a list of dialed phone numbers 
was not protected by the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 
444–45 (1976) (holding that a bank customer had no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
his records because they were disclosed to third-party employees); Hoffa v. United States, 
385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (ruling that testimony regarding statements to a secret 
government informant was allowable under the Fourth Amendment); Lopez v. United 
States, 373 U.S. 427, 437–40 (1963) (holding that an electronic recording device that was 
not unlawfully planted by physical invasion did not violate defendant’s Fourth 
Amendment rights). 
35 Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–46. 
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police can accordingly obtain a list of anyone’s dialed numbers without a 
warrant or probable cause. 
The concept of voluntary disclosure is central to the third-party 
doctrine.36  The earliest third-party doctrine cases involved suspects 
voluntarily sharing details of their crimes with government informants or 
undercover agents.37  The Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not 
protect a person who “voluntarily confides his wrongdoing” to another.38  
The Court then expanded the doctrine to cover financial records and phone 
numbers disclosed to businesses.39 
In the internet era, the third-party doctrine threatens to eliminate 
privacy protections for a vast swath of personal information, including web 
surfing data, cloud-stored documents, medical and biometric data, and 
location information.40  These and many other forms of digital information 
are regularly disclosed to third-party service providers.41  Accordingly, 
government investigators may be able to obtain enormous quantities of 
personal information without a warrant.42  
 
36 Id. at 742−45; Miller, 425 U.S. at 435, 442; United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 
(1971) (plurality opinion). 
37 White, 401 U.S. at 746–47; Lopez, 373 U.S. at 428–29. 
38 White, 401 U.S. at 749 (quoting Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302). 
39 Miller, 425 U.S. at 442 (“All of the documents obtained, including financial statements 
and deposit slips, contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed 
to their employees in the ordinary course of business.”).  Likewise, telephone customers, 
who know that telephone companies receive and record the numbers they dial, voluntarily 
disclose those numbers to their service provider and therefore waive any Fourth 
Amendment right in the numbers.  Smith, 442 U.S. at 744 (“When he used his phone, 
petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and 
‘exposed’ that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business.  In so 
doing, petitioner assumed the risk that the company would reveal to police the numbers he 
dialed.”). 
40 See, e.g., Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L. REV. 
581, 585 (2011) (noting that third-party doctrine precedents are problematic in an age 
where individuals store enormous amounts of personal information on various third-party 
platforms). 
41 See id.; see also Tokson supra note 11, at 53. 
42 Such data is regularly stored in databases and made available to the government upon 
request or subpoena.  See Tokson, supra note 40, at 585. 
DRAFT - Forthcoming, 105 Cornell Law Review __ (2021) 
 
9 
The third-party doctrine has been widely criticized,43 and the Supreme 
Court has not applied it in a case since 1979.44  Several states have repudiated 
the doctrine via constitutional or statutory law,45 and Justice Sotomayor 
criticized it in an influential concurrence in United States v. Jones.46  Yet most 
lower courts continued to vigorously enforce the doctrine in cases involving 
email to/from data, IP addresses, cell phone data, and more.47  As government 
surveillance of digital information held by third parties proliferated, it 
became clear that the Supreme Court would have to reexamine the 
third-party doctrine and its application to new technologies.48  
 
43 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT 
SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 151–64 (2007) (critiquing the 
third-party doctrine in the context of third-party subpoenas); Jack M. Balkin, The 
Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1, 19–20 (2008) 
(characterizing Fourth Amendment protections for personal data as weak due to the 
third-party doctrine); Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment: 
Protecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 
975, 976–77 (2007) (contending that the third-party doctrine is one of the most serious 
threats to privacy in the digital age); Neil Richards, The Third-Party Doctrine and the 
Future of the Cloud, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1441, 1475–80 (2017) (asserting that the 
third-party doctrine as applied in a digital context undermines the core values of the 
Fourth Amendment). 
44 Smith, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
45 See Stephen E. Henderson, Learning from All Fifty States: How to Apply the Fourth 
Amendment and Its State Analogs to Protect Third Party Information from Unreasonable 
Search, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 373, 395–405 (2006) (reporting numerous states that have 
rejected the third-party doctrine in whole or in part, including California, New Jersey, and 
Pennsylvania, among others). 
46 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  In Jones, 
the Court held that attaching a GPS tracking device to the underside of a car was a Fourth 
Amendment search that required a valid warrant.  Id. at 404. 
47 See, e.g., In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 
(5th Cir. 2013) (ruling that cell site data is not protected under the Fourth Amendment); 
United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 330–31 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding that the 
third-party doctrine applies to e-mail metadata such as to/from addresses); United States v. 
Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 511 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that email to/from addresses and IP 
addresses are not searches according to the third-party doctrine); Freedman v. Am. Online, 
Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 174, 182–83 (D. Conn. 2005) (holding that there is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in AOL subscriber information when the user permitted AOL to 
release the information to third parties). 
48 See generally Stephen E. Henderson, After United States v. Jones, After the Fourth 
Amendment Third Party Doctrine, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 431, 432–33 (2013) (recounting 
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B. Carpenter and Cell Phone Tracking 
Several times per minute, a cell phone emits radio waves that 
communicate with the antennae on cell phone towers.49  Cell phone 
companies generally track which antennae and which towers receive a cell 
phone’s signal.  By doing so, they can generate a record of the user’s location 
over time.  They collect and store this data for various purposes, including 
network maintenance and applying roaming charges.  They also sell this data 
to third parties for use in marketing and analytics.50 
Over the past two decades, law enforcement officials have frequently 
sought to obtain cell phone location data for use in criminal investigations.51  
Lower courts mostly approved this tactic, holding that the Fourth 
Amendment did not apply to such data because users had knowingly exposed 
it to their cell phone companies.52  Scholars and other observers were alarmed, 
raising concerns about pervasive, low-cost location tracking by the 
government.53  After several federal appeals courts had weighed in, the 
Supreme Court decided to review a case where the government used cell 
 
the history and application of the third-party doctrine and speculating that the changing 
nature of technology will require the Supreme Court to limit or avoid the doctrine). 
49 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211–12 (2018). 
50 See id.  For further discussion of cell site location information (CSLI) and cell phone 
provider data retention practices, see Matthew Tokson, Knowledge and Fourth Amendment 
Privacy, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 139, 160−61 (2016). 
51 See Tokson, supra note 50, at 159. 
52 Indeed, the federal courts of appeal were virtually unanimous in declaring that cell phone 
location information could be obtained without a warrant.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc); United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 
498, 511 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc); In re Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site 
Data, 724 F.3d 600, 612 (5th Cir. 2013).  But cf. In re Application of U.S. for an Order 
Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 
304, 317 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating that “it is unlikely that cell phone customers are aware 
that their cell phone providers collect and store historical location information” while 
resolving the case based on a statutory interpretation influenced by constitutional analysis).  
53 Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question of Law, 
Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681, 709 (2011); Tokson, supra note 50, at 183; Who Has Your 
Back?, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., (2013), https://www.eff.org/who-has-your-back-
2013?support_whyb=1&social=1 [https://perma.cc/8DPV-X8YQ]. 
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phone location data to place a suspect at the scene of several robberies.54 
In Carpenter  v. United States, the Court held that the government’s 
warrantless acquisition of Carpenter’s cell phone location data violated the 
Fourth Amendment.55  The Court expressly limited the third-party doctrine, 
making it inapplicable to cell phone location data stored by a third party.  
Cell phone tracking was so revealing, detailed, and low in cost that it 
“implicate[d] privacy concerns far beyond” those considered in previous 
cases.56  Tracking a cell phone for long periods of time provides an 
all-encompassing record of an owner’s activities.57  It opens an “intimate 
window into a person’s life,” potentially revealing his familial, political, 
professional, religious, and sexual associations.58  Such tracking is also 
“remarkably easy, cheap, and efficient,” capable of accessing vast repositories 
of personal data at little cost to government inspectors.59 
Moreover, the surveillance at issue was practically “inescapable.”60  Cell 
phones have become “such a pervasive . . . part of daily life that carrying one 
is indispensable to participation in modern society.”61  And cell phones 
transmit location data to service providers automatically, such that users have 
no opportunity to opt out.  Accordingly, cell phone users do not voluntarily 
give up their information—they have no real choice but to disclose their 
location data to their service providers.  Indeed, there was no feasible way to 
avoid the technology or to use it differently that would allow people to escape 
 
54 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212–13. 
55 Id. at 2221, 2223. 
56 Id. at 2220.  Cell phone records contain vast stores of historical location data and 
potentially allow the police to track suspects “every moment of every day for five years.”  
Id. at 2218.  Virtually every American could be tracked at any time.  Id.  (“Critically, 
because location information is continually logged for all of the 400 million devices in the 
United States—not just those belonging to persons who might happen to come under 
investigation—this newfound tracking capacity runs against everyone.”).  And the cost of 
such monitoring had drastically decreased, removing an important barrier to excessive 
location tracking by the government.  Id. at 2217 (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 
U.S. 400, 429 (Alito, J., concurring)). 
57 Id. at 2217. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 2217−18. 
60 Id. at 2223. 
61 Id. at 2220 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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disclosure.62  For all of these reasons, the Court declined to extend the 
third-party doctrine to cell phone location information.  
Carpenter is a landmark Fourth Amendment decision—it establishes a 
foundation for Fourth Amendment privacy in shared digital information.  It 
limits the third-party doctrine and refines the concept of voluntary 
disclosure.  At a minimum, when an information-collecting technology is 
inescapable, revealing, and comprehensive, the Court will no longer hold that 
using it eliminates a person’s Fourth Amendment rights.  Yet the Court’s use 
of inescapability in its Fourth Amendment analysis threatens to undermine 
meaningful privacy protections for many forms of digital data.  As an 
inescapability standard gains support among scholars and lower courts, its 
weaknesses have gone mostly overlooked. 
C. Theories of Inescapability 
The Carpenter decision represents a momentous change in Fourth 
Amendment law.  But the precise contours of that change remain unclear.  
The Court’s opinion is notably ambiguous,63 and it does not directly apply 
its rationale to any form of information other than historical cell site data.64  
As with many major decisions, Carpenter’s meaning will ultimately emerge 
from lower court interpretations, scholars’ analyses, and the Court’s future 
cases.65 
 
62 See id. at 2211–12, 2220.  
63 See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 16, at 451−53; Dalton, supra note 14, at 23; Laura K. 
Donohue, Functional Equivalence and Residual Rights Post-Carpenter: Framing a Test 
Consistent with Precedent and Original Meaning, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 347, 372; Lior 
Strahilevitz & Matthew Tokson, Ten Thoughts on Today’s Blockbuster Fourth Amendment 




64 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2206, 2220. 
65 See Caminker, supra note 16, at 460.  The meaning of Katz v. United States, the 
landmark decision that first applied the Fourth Amendment to intangible things like 
telephone conversations, only emerged over time as subsequent cases interpreted and 
applied Katz.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 
466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984) (clarifying that a Fourth Amendment search occurs when a 
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In general, inescapability doctrine can be theorized as based in concepts 
of fairness.  It is less fair to eliminate a person’s privacy rights on the basis of 
their disclosure of information when that disclosure could not have 
reasonably been avoided.66  In addition, when disclosure is inescapable, a 
person cannot be said to have assumed the risk of the government obtaining 
the disclosed information.67  Nor has the person made a fully voluntary 
choice to reduce their privacy.68 
Many scholars place inescapability at the core of Fourth Amendment 
law going forward, although their specific approaches vary.69  Some have 
interpreted Carpenter as establishing a multi-factor test in which 
inescapability is an important factor.70  For example, Paul Ohm posits that 
Carpenter creates a broadly applicable test that examines 1) how revealing the 
information is; 2) its depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach, and 
 
government act violates an individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy”); United States 
v. Guadalupe-Garza, 421 F.2d 876, 878 (9th Cir. 1970) (considering whether defendant 
had a “reasonable ‘expectation of privacy’” when crossing the border from Mexico to 
California (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,  9 (1968))); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 
(1968) (“We have recently held that . . . wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable 
‘expectation of privacy,’ he is entitled to be free from unreasonable government intrusion.” 
(quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring))); see also, e.g., Anthony G. 
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 384 (1974) 
(providing early analysis of the Katz test and noting the largely objective and normative 
nature of the test); William C. Heffernan, Fourth Amendment Privacy Interests, 92 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 37 (2001) (describing how the Court looks to social norms and 
practices to identify reasonable expectations of privacy). 
66 See Laura Moy, The Underappreciated Role of Avoidability in U.S. Privacy Law 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
67 Cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (stating that the voluntary disclosure 
of information was an assumption of risk of further disclosure). 
68 See Ari Ezra Waldman, Durkheim's Internet: Social and Political Theory in Online Society, 
7 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 345, 409–10 (2013) (describing the concept of constructive 
involuntariness in the context of internet use). 
69 See infra notes 70–78 and accompanying text.  Laura Donohue has criticized the Court’s 
use of voluntariness concepts in Carpenter as part of her proposal for a property-based 
Fourth Amendment along the lines of Justice Gorsuch’s Carpenter dissent.  See Donohue, 
supra note 63, at 381–82.  She argues that information created and stored by others due to 
a consumer’s actions, such as cell phone location data, should be considered the consumer’s 
property for Fourth Amendment purposes.  Id. at 388–99. 
70 See, e.g., Dalton, supra note 14, at 22; Ohm, supra note 8, at 369. 
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3) whether exposure of the information is inescapable.71  Information is 
revealing when it is intimate or otherwise sensitive and its disclosure is likely 
to harm the individuals involved.72  Depth, breadth, and comprehensive 
reach generally refer to the precision of the information, the duration of 
observation, and the number of people observed.  With regard to 
inescapability, Ohm explains that “[s]ome forms of data collection are 
inescapable because they relate to services one needs to use to be a functioning 
member of today’s society.”73  He also describes the intertwined concept of 
automatic information collection, which occurs when data is inevitably 
generated by a product or service and consumers have no opportunity to opt 
out.  Ohm sees inescapability as a key factor to be weighed in each case rather 
than an ironclad requirement for Fourth Amendment protection.74 
By contrast, Orin Kerr views inescapability as an absolute prerequisite 
for Fourth Amendment protection in data held by third parties.75  He 
contends that Carpenter limited the third-party doctrine largely on the 
ground that people have no choice but to disclose their location information 
to cell phone providers.76  Going forward, courts must determine whether 
individuals have a meaningful choice to refrain from certain activities or 
information disclosures.  Information that is inevitably shared is safeguarded.  
But when consumers venture “beyond what the technology requires” for 
participation in modern life, their data is not protected.77  Other scholars 
have noted the ambiguity of the Carpenter standard while emphasizing the 
central importance of inescapability to whichever standard ultimately 
 
71 Ohm, supra note 8, at 369−70.  Ohm views this test as applicable in virtually all 
surveillance cases, not just those involving data held by third parties.  Id. at 392−93. 
72 Id. at 371–73.73 Id. at 376–77 (emphasis omitted). 
73 Id. at 376–77 (emphasis omitted). 
74 See id. at 380, 382–83 (weighing inescapability as an important but not essential factor 
in a multi-factor test). 
75 Kerr, supra note 15, at 20 (“This requirement . . . comes from Carpenter itself.”); id. at 
21 (“Carpenter has a compulsion requirement.”); see Caminker, supra note 16, at 451 
(noting the possibility of an inescapability requirement). 
76 Kerr, supra note 15, at 20−21. 
77 Id. at 22. 
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emerges.78  Currently, the dominant conceptual frameworks for 
post-Carpenter Fourth Amendment law rely heavily on inescapability to 
determine privacy rights. 
D. Inescapability in the Lower Courts 
Many lower courts consider inescapability a core determinant of Fourth 
Amendment protection after Carpenter.  These courts generally use 
inescapability as an important factor in applying Carpenter, and some regard 
it as essential to Fourth Amendment protection.  However, lower courts’ 
applications of Carpenter are hardly uniform or settled.79  While the precise 
contours of post-Carpenter doctrine remain in flux, the inescapability of 
information disclosure is likely to play a major role in Fourth Amendment 
law going forward. 
Numerous cases applying Carpenter have found that individuals lack a 
Fourth Amendment right in information disclosed as part of an optional or 
escapable activity.  For example, in United States v. Hood, the First Circuit 
held that the government could warrantlessly collect a user’s IP address data 
associated with a messaging app.80  The court reasoned that the app was 
purely optional and thus people easily “could escape” any surveillance 
associated with the app.81  In United States v. Kidd, a federal district court 
likewise held that the government could warrantlessly obtain IP address data 
associated with a cell phone service, even though this data might reveal a 
user’s location for a period of 581 days.82  The court concluded that the 
 
78 See Caminker, supra note 16, at 451 (positing that the Court may impose inescapability 
as a requirement while acknowledging the possibility that it may be only a factor). 
79 Some courts have largely ignored inescapability and focused on the other factors 
identified in Carpenter, especially the revealing and extensive nature of the data sought.  See 
infra note 93. 
80 United States v. Hood, 920 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 2019). 
81 Id. (quoting United States v. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018)).  The court 
likewise noted that the app only generated IP address information when the user made “the 
affirmative decision to access [the] website or application.”  Id. 
82 See United States v. Kidd, 394 F. Supp. 3d 357, 358–59, 365–66 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) 
(discussing the potential for cell phone IP address information to reveal location, although 
noting that it is generally less revealing than CSLI data). 
DRAFT - Forthcoming, 105 Cornell Law Review __ (2021) 
  
16 
service, which provided voice-over-internet-protocol (VOIP) phone calls, 
was not “ubiquitous” or inescapable and it therefore received less Fourth 
Amendment protection.83  In United States v. Sigouin, a magistrate judge 
found that requesting files via a peer-to-peer service was not “indispensable 
to participation in modern society” like cell phone use, but was entirely 
voluntary and avoidable.84  Accordingly, the government could record an 
internet user’s peer-to-peer requests without a warrant.85  In United States v. 
Cox, the judge ruled that the FBI could obtain Facebook activity records 
because the defendant had not established that Facebook was ubiquitous or 
“as indispensable as the cell phone” and because record generation “require[s] 
affirmative action by the user.”86  In United States v. Morel and several other 
cases, circuit and district courts have held that subscriber information was 
unprotected because, unlike cell phone location data, an individual 
affirmatively chooses to provide it to an internet service.87  State courts have 
 
83 Id. at 365–67.  The court noted that the data collection might violate the Fourth 
Amendment if the defendant could demonstrate that the data collection was automatic and 
thus inescapable or that the location data collected was detailed and extensive.  Id. at 367–
68. 
84 United States v. Sigouin, No. 19-80136-CR, 2019 WL 7373045, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 
19, 2019) (quoting Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220), report and recommendation adopted, No. 
9:19-CR-80136, 2019 WL 7372958 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 31, 2019). 
85 Id. at *7; see also United States v. Shipton, No. 0:18-CR-202-PJS-KMM, 2019 WL 
5330928, at *14 (D. Minn. Sept. 11, 2019) (concluding that “[t]he P2P software user 
makes an intentional choice to connect to a network and has deliberately selected the files 
she is willing to share in a designated folder” and therefore “[t]he peer-to-peer file sharer 
plainly assumes the risk that anyone using the software could see the files she is sharing 
while a cell phone user has not engaged in any sort of comparable voluntary act”), report 
and recommendation adopted, No. 18-CR-0202 (PJS/KMM), 2019 WL 5305573 (D. 
Minn. Oct. 21, 2019). 
86United States v. Cox, No. 1:18-CR-83-HAB, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97326, at *6, *10 
(N.D. Ind. June 3, 2020). 
87 Id.; United States v. Morel, 922 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2019) (“[A]n internet user generates 
the IP address data . . . only by making the affirmative decision to access a website or 
application.” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Hood, 920 F.3d 87, 92 (1st 
Cir. 2019)); United States v. Maclin, 393 F. Supp. 3d 701, 708 (N.D. Ohio 2019) 
(“Subscriber information requires an individual’s active participation – the subscriber only 
captures information when the platform is used.”); United States v. Tolbert, No. 14-3761 
JCH, 2019 WL 2006464, at *3 (D.N.M. May 7, 2019) (“[T]he subpoenaed data appears 
to have been generated from Tolbert’s own affirmative actions in utilizing CenturyLink 
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likewise held that information that a defendant could have withheld but 
nonetheless disclosed when he entered into a transaction was not protected 
by the Fourth Amendment.88 
 Other cases have upheld Fourth Amendment rights because the 
surveillance at issue was automatic or otherwise inescapable.  In Naperville 
Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, the Seventh Circuit held that a 
city’s collection of data from its citizens’ smart utility meters was a Fourth 
Amendment search.89  Citizens had “no choice at all” but to install the 
required meters and therefore did not voluntarily disclose their data.90  In 
United States v. Diggs, the federal district court held that GPS data generated 
by a device installed before the sale of a vehicle was protected by the Fourth 
Amendment because the data disclosure was involuntary and occurred 
without the owner’s knowledge.91  In State v. Martinez, the government’s 
testing of a patient’s blood sample violated the Fourth Amendment because 
the patient did not voluntarily give his blood to be tested and could not have 
avoided having his blood drawn.92 
To be sure, not all lower court cases applying Carpenter rely on 
inescapability.  Some cases instead focus on other factors, such as the 
revealing and extensive nature of the data at issue. 93  The tension between 
 
and AOL, and in this way is distinguishable from the CSLI data in Carpenter.”); United 
States v. Therrien, No. 2:18-CR-00085, 2019 WL 1147479, at *2–3 (D. Vt. Mar. 13, 
2019) (“In this case, law enforcement obtained information that an account holder 
voluntarily turned over to Google.”). 
88 State v. Leonard, 923 N.W.2d 52, 57–58 (Minn. Ct. App. 2019) (holding that appellant 
lacked a Fourth Amendment right in the information he gave when securing a hotel room 
because, unlike a cell phone user, he “chose . . . to provide identifying information to the 
hotel as a means of securing a hotel room”). 
89 Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 900 F.3d 521, 527 (7th Cir. 
2018). 
90 Id. 
91 United States v. Diggs, 385 F. Supp. 3d 648, 660–61 (N.D. Ill. 2019). 
92 State v. Martinez, 570 S.W.3d 278, 288 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019) (evaluating 
voluntariness and explaining that the patient was incoherent when hospitalized and was 
unable to consent to or refuse the blood draw). 
93 United States v. Howard, No. 1:19-CR-54-WKW, 2019 WL 6048885, at *6 (M.D. Ala. 
Nov. 15, 2019) (holding that one-day warrantless GPS tracking did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment because it was shorter in duration and less revealing than cell phone tracking); 
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these cases and the cases that depend on inescapability highlights the 
uncertain nature of Fourth Amendment law post-Carpenter.  Nonetheless, 
numerous courts and several prominent scholars have relied on 
inescapability, and it appears likely to shape Fourth Amendment law for years 
to come.  The next Part casts a critical eye on this development and identifies 
several reasons to doubt that inescapability can function effectively as a 
determinant of Fourth Amendment protection. 
II. CHALLENGING THE PREMISES OF INESCAPABILITY  
This Part questions the conventional account of inescapability in Fourth 
Amendment law.  It examines the theoretical, practical, and normative flaws 
of inescapability as a Fourth Amendment standard.  Inescapability is 
conceptually ambiguous and difficult for courts to assess.  It does a poor job 
of protecting the most intimate forms of personal electronic data.  Further, 
the incentives that an inescapability standard creates would cause substantial 
social harm, as consumers either forego beneficial technologies or lose privacy 
rights in their personal information.  Finally, it would create doctrinal 
confusion because several longstanding Fourth Amendment precedents 
conflict with the inescapability model.  This Part analyzes these issues and 
challenges the premise that inescapabilty is an effective paradigm for Fourth 
Amendment protection. 
 
United States v. Kelly, 385 F. Supp. 3d 721, 726–27 (E.D. Wis. 2019) (holding that the 
government could warrantlessly capture video from the hallway of an apartment building 
which was not the defendant’s residence because the camera collected little information 
and the information captured was not sensitive); United States v. Jenkins, No. 
1:18-CR-181-MLB-CMS, 2019 WL 2482171, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 5, 2019) (finding 
that the basic subscriber information associated with a user’s internet accounts was less 
revealing and involved far less data than cell phone tracking, and was therefore not a 
Fourth Amendment search), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:18-CR-00181, 
2019 WL 1568154 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 11, 2019); People v. Tafoya, 2019 COA 176, ¶¶ 42–
48 (ruling that video surveillance of the curtilage of a suspect’s home for a three-month 
period violated the Fourth Amendment because such monitoring captured a great deal of 
information over time and could reveal sensitive details about a person’s life).  These 
opinions do not overtly reject the concept of inescapability, but they do resolve novel 
Fourth Amendment questions without addressing it. 
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A. Conceptual and Practical Issues 
The first set of issues surrounding inescapability involve the difficulty of 
defining it as a concept or assessing it in real-world cases.  Inescapability 
cannot be taken literally because virtually all forms of information disclosure 
are avoidable in theory.  On the other hand, a more nuanced inquiry into 
how escapable a technology is would create severe administrability problems 
and doctrinal unpredictability.  In addition, the society-wide nature of the 
inescapability inquiry overlooks individual differences and ignores 
disadvantaged and disabled individuals.  This section explores these issues. 
1. Everything Is Escapable in Theory 
An “inescapability” standard for Fourth Amendment protection is 
conceptually problematic.  It cannot mean what it says.  Virtually every form 
of digital surveillance is escapable with sufficient effort.  Technologies 
regularly arise that allow users to avoid surveillance as they use the internet 
or communicate electronically with each other.94  Even unavoidable 
disclosures to third parties can be bargained around, at least in theory.95 
Take internet data, for example.  Internet use is a central part of modern 
life.96  Records of the websites that a user visits are often collected by the 
user’s internet service provider (ISP)97 or by affiliated groups of websites that 
collect the URLs of each page a user sees within their group.98  Because these 
 
94 See infra notes 100–104 and accompanying text. 
95 See infra notes 105–107 and accompanying text. 
96 Kerr, supra note 15, at 47. 
97 Peter Segrist, How the Rise of Big Data and Predictive Analytics Are Changing the 
Attorney’s Duty of Competence, 16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 527, 542–43 (2015); Matthew 
Tokson, The Next Wave of Fourth Amendment Challenges After Carpenter, 59 WASHBURN 
L.J. 1, 13 (forthcoming 2020).  For instance, ISPs often maintain logs of the IP addresses 
of each website a user visits along with the volume of data transmitted to and from the 
user.  See Tokson, supra note 40, at 603.  Some ISPs retain the URL of each individual 
page visited by a user.  Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1424–25, 1432–38. 
98 See, e.g., Omer Tene, What Google Knows: Privacy and Internet Search Engines, 2008 
UTAH L. REV. 1433, 1447–48.  In addition, some third-party entities place “web beacons” 
on affiliated websites that track in the user’s activity on a particular site.  Segrist, supra note 
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records are created whenever a user visits a website, revealing one’s internet 
habits may seem inescapable.99  But there are relatively low-cost steps that 
users can take to prevent the disclosure of their internet data. 
Users can set up a Virtual Private Network to hide their internet activity 
from their ISP and remain largely anonymous as they surf the web.100  They 
can use the well-known and free TorBrowser to hide their IP address and 
encrypt their web traffic.101  They can simply opt out of Google’s collection 
of their search term history.102  And they can send messages through free 
services like TorMessenger, TorChat, SecureDrop, or other services that 
allow users to conceal their communications metadata and IP addresses.103  
 
97.  These various entities can use websurfing information to target advertisements to the 
individual user or sell the information to third-party advertisers.  Tokson, supra note 40, at 
603. 
99 See Kerr, supra note 15, at 47. 
100 For example, users can download the Express VPN app at https://www.expressvpn.com 
[https://perma.cc/SA5H-9X8X].  Note that websites may be able to compromise 
VPN-based anonymity via “fingerprinting”—the practice of tracking visitors to websites 
based on the unique characteristics of their computers such as screen resolution, internal 
network address, and downloaded fonts.  See Geoffrey A. Fowler, Think You’re Anonymous 




101 Andy Greenberg, The Grand Tor: How to Go Anonymous Online, WIRED (Dec. 9, 
2017), https://www.wired.com/story/the-grand-tor/ [https://perma.cc/B89L-F72X].  Tor 
browsers are also effective against “fingerprinting.”  See Fowler, supra note 100.  
102 Kristin Burnham, 5 Google Opt-Out Settings to Check, INFORMATIONWEEK (Jan. 11, 
2014), https://www.informationweek.com/software/social/5-google-opt-out-settings-to-
check/d/d-id/1113405 [https://perma.cc/BPX9-BSWC ] (“Unless you consistently delete 
it, Google tracks and logs all your web history, including your image, news, map, and 
video searches.  You can remove all or some of your search history, or opt out of Google 
tracking you entirely.”).  Users could also use the DuckDuckGo search engine, which by 
default does not collect IP addresses or user information.  DUCKDUCKGO, 
https://duckduckgo.com/privacy [https://perma.cc/NH3V-L388] (last visited July 28, 
2020). 
103 See Greenberg, supra note 101; see also Dan Goodin, New Signal Privacy Feature 
Removes Sender ID from Metadata, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 30, 2018, 1:00 AM), 
https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/10/new-signal-privacy-feature-
removes-sender-id-from-metadata/ [https://perma.cc/6D9X-E3DX] (noting that Signal 
will continue to map senders’ IP addresses but will offer a service placing most user 
information inside the encrypted message rather than in the header). 
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Few internet users actually avail themselves of these options, perhaps because 
of concerns about cost, speed, or convenience, or because they are unaware 
of them.104  But the disclosure of internet data to private parties is largely 
escapable, in theory. 
To take this point even further, consider that users can in theory bargain 
with any service provider for more privacy, no matter how unavoidable the 
underlying technology may be.105  In a Coasian world with no transaction 
costs, customers could simply pay their service providers to immediately 
delete any information collected about them.106  Of course, this might be 
difficult to negotiate in the real world.107  But it points up a conceptual failure 
 
104 See, e.g., Users, TOR METRICS, https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-
country.html?start=2019-11-07&end=2020-02-05&country=us&events=off 
[https://perma.cc/2JPA-N38K] (last visited Feb. 5, 2020) (displaying an estimate of 
roughly 800,000 American Tor users as of February 2020). 
105 Even cell phone tracking itself might in theory be avoided through bargaining.  
Typically, a user’s location information is deleted after several years of storage.  See United 
States v. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2210 (2018); Cell Phone Location Tracking Request 
Response—Cell Phone Company Data Retention Chart, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/cell-
phone-location-tracking-request-response-cell-phone-company-data-retention-chart 
[https://perma.cc/RT7D-5WLK] (last visited July 31, 2020).  Hypothetically, nothing 
prohibits a cell phone user from paying their service provider to immediately delete any 
location information gathered from their cell phone.  However, the cell phone companies 
contacted for this article either stated that they would not be willing to negotiate the 
deletion of user data (Sprint, Verizon) or declined to comment on the matter (AT&T, 
T-Mobile, U.S. Cellular).  Note that it may be possible to avoid location tracking by 
purchasing a Blackphone or other VOIP-based phone and run it on Wi-Fi networks, 
avoiding cell signal disclosure entirely.  See Jill Scharr, Blackphone vs. FreedomPop’s Privacy 
Phone: Security Showdown, TOM’S GUIDE (Mar. 8, 2014), 
https://www.tomsguide.com/us/blackphone-vs-freedompop-privacy-phone,news-
18427.html [https://perma.cc/R2Z9-4YXF].  While phones might be traced via Wi-Fi 
network, secure phones use a VPN to connect to the internet in order to preserve user 
anonymity.  Id.; Martin Beltov, Cell Phones Can Easily Be Traced via WiFi, BEST SECURITY 
SEARCH, https://bestsecuritysearch.com/cell-phones-can-easily-traced-via-wifi 
[https://perma.cc/9EWH-28A7] (last visited July 31, 2020). 
106 The Coase theorem, developed by Nobel Prize winner Ronald Coase, posits that in a 
world with no transaction costs, initial allocations of property rights would not matter 
because parties would bargain efficiently to distribute property to the highest value user.  
E.g., R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1–2 (1960); Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Marginal Utility and the Coase Theorem, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 783, 783–84 
(1990);. 
107 See supra note 105. 
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of the inescapability standard: everything is escapable, for a price. 
This is not to say that every lower court judge will apply the 
inescapability standard literally.  Many will take a more nuanced approach.108  
But there is serious risk in establishing a standard that, taken literally, would 
render the Fourth Amendment inapplicable to most forms of digital 
information.  Lower courts often apply Fourth Amendment standards 
literally, even when doing so exposes sensitive information to government 
surveillance.109  And judges applying a more lenient concept of inescapability 
will nonetheless be influenced by arguments demonstrating how feasible it is 
in many cases to avoid information disclosure.  An inescapability standard 
puts individuals asserting privacy rights at a rhetorical and practical 
disadvantage. 
2. Administrability Problems in Practice 
Courts applying an inescapability standard might engage in a more 
subtle inquiry into precisely how escapable a given technology is.110  
 
108 See infra section II.A.2. 
109 For example, lower courts attempted to ascertain whether cell phone users had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy by trying to estimate their knowledge regarding how cell 
phones operate and the information disclosures inherent in cell phone use.  United States 
v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 888 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[A]ny cellphone user who has seen her 
phone’s signal strength fluctuate must know that, when she places or receives a call, her 
phone ‘exposes’ its location to the nearest cell tower and thus to the company that operates 
the tower.”); In re Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 612 
(5th Cir. 2013) (“[U]sers know that they convey information about their location to their 
service providers when they make a call . . . .”); In re Application of the U.S. for an Order 
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(c)–(d), 42 F. Supp. 3d 511, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) 
(“[S]ubscribers are aware that use of their cell phones necessitates disclosure of the 
information sought.”); United States v. Madison, No. 11-60285-CR, 2012 WL 3095357, 
at *8 (S.D. Fla. July 30, 2012) (stating that it is “common knowledge that 
communications companies regularly collect and maintain all types of non-content 
information regarding cell-phone communications, including cell-site tower data, for cell 
phones for which they provide service”).  Subsequent empirical studies found that most 
courts’ estimates of societal knowledge were erroneous.  See Tokson, supra note 50, at 176–
79 (reporting survey results indicating that the vast majority of cell phone users were 
unaware that their phones could be tracked using cell phone signals). 
110 See Kerr, supra note 15, at 21. 
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Surveillance could be deemed inescapable whenever avoiding it would be 
sufficiently difficult or costly for the average consumer.111  But this would be 
an ambiguous and fact-heavy inquiry, with results that would change over 
time as technologies and social practices change.112  Making it a part of 
Fourth Amendment analysis would render adjudication more difficult and 
less predictable while providing minimal offsetting benefit.113 
Consider the assessment of whether a technology is “indispensable to 
participation in modern society” and thus unavoidable.114  Professor Kerr, 
interpreting Carpenter’s standard, envisions this as a “philosophical question” 
involving three further inquiries: “First, what does modern society look like; 
second, what does it mean to participate in that society; and third, what 
technologies are needed to achieve that participation.”115  These are difficult, 
abstract questions bound up with complex technological and sociological 
issues.  Such questions may be especially difficult for courts to resolve 
effectively.116  Indeed, many lower court rulings on inescapability 
post-Carpenter reach questionable conclusions about whether individuals can 
actually avoid the use of certain technologies or practices.117 
 
111 Cf. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018) (discussing the ubiquity 
of cell phones and their indispensable nature in modern society). 
112 As the petitioner’s brief in Carpenter noted, the cell phone has gone from a niche 
technology to the primary means of technological communication in the United States.  
See Brief for Petitioner at 39−42, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct 2206 (2018) (No. 
16-402).  Cell phones now dominate the field of voice communication devices.  Id. at 40.  
(“A majority of American homes now do not have a landline telephone, as residents rely 
exclusively on cell phones.”).  Moreover, cell phones enable several other types of electronic 
communication that play a central role in modern life, including texts, emails, messaging, 
social media, and more.  Id. 
113 See infra subpart II.C (discussing the normative undesirability of the inescapability 
inquiry). 
114 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220. 
115 Kerr, supra note 15, at 21. 
116 See Donohue, supra note 63, at 381−83. 
117 For example, courts have suggested that bank cards, instant messaging apps, and 
internet service providers are optional rather than essential parts of modern life.  See United 
States v. Hood, 920 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 2019) (holding that the use of a messaging app 
was optional and a user “could escape” it); United States v. Tolbert, No. CR 14-3761 
JCH, 2019 WL 2006464, at *3 (D.N.M. May 7, 2019) (finding that, unlike cell phone 
data, subscriber information was generated voluntarily by a suspect when he chose to use 
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The inescapability standard would saddle judges with high decision 
costs.  Elevated decision costs may be justified in some contexts, such as when 
a balancing test that captures essential normative considerations outperforms 
a simpler standard.118  But inescapability is not this type of test.  Indeed, as 
discussed below, it would create harmful incentives for consumers and do a 
poor job of protecting sensitive personal information.119  Before Carpenter, 
inescapability might have been useful as a way to rebut the now-outmoded 
claim that any disclosure of data to a third party eliminates privacy rights in 
that data.120 After Carpenter, and as the law continues to adapt to changing 
technological and social contexts, the numerous drawbacks of inescapability 
as a standard outweigh any remaining benefits. 
3. Inescapability and Disadvantage 
The inescapability inquiry appears to focus on the population as a whole, 
asking whether consumers in general can escape a given technology or 
surveillance practice.121  This may help avoid further complicating an already 
difficult inquiry.  But it does so at the expense of accurately measuring 
whether an individual can avoid disclosing their information. 
 
an internet service provider); United States v. Frei, No. 3:17-CR-00032, 2019 WL 
189826, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 14, 2019) (stating that the use of bank cards was 
voluntary, unlike cell-phone use).  The vague, abstract nature of the inescapability standard 
may yield especially high error rates, and courts may be tempted in difficult cases simply to 
defer to the government. 
118 Matthew Tokson, Blank Slates, 59 B.C. L. REV. 591, 613–18 (2018). 
119 See infra subparts II.B−C. 
120 This strong-form third-party doctrine concept is reflected in the much-criticized cases 
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979) and United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 
435, 442–43 (1976).  The Supreme Court has not applied this concept since 1979 and 
repudiated it in Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220. 
121 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211 (recounting, in the first substantive sentence of the 
opinion, that there are more cell phones in use in the United States than there are people); 
id. at 2218 (describing the common practices of cell phone owners, including carrying 
their phones with them wherever they go); United States v. Kidd, 394 F. Supp. 3d 357, 
367 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (analyzing the societal ubiquity of a VOIP calling service); Kerr, 
supra note 15, at 21 (describing the inescapability inquiry as centered on modern society 
and modern life); id. at 48–49 (arguing that ride-sharing apps are not indispensable to 
modern life because people can generally choose alternative modes of travel). 
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People will vary widely in their reliance on various technologies and their 
ability to avoid surveillance.  A privacy-threatening technology that most 
people can easily escape may be inescapable for others.  For example, 
ride-sharing apps such as Uber create and store records of all the trips taken 
by their users.  For most people, the use of such apps is optional.122  They can 
simply walk, take a bus, or drive their own car.  For proponents of an 
inescapability standard, ride-sharing apps are the paradigm example of an 
avoidable technology. 
Yet for some individuals, ride-sharing apps may be as indispensable as 
cell phones or internet access.  For disabled persons not living near public 
transportation, ride-sharing services may be the only viable means of 
transportation.123  For individuals who cannot afford a car, ride-shares may 
be essential for getting to appointments, social functions, job interviews, and 
the like.124  Studies have shown that majority-black neighborhoods often rely 
heavily on ride-sharing services, in part because those services may offer 
greater geographical coverage and less racial discrimination than traditional 
taxi services.125  In many areas, non-ride-share taxis are unavailable or are 
 
122 Kerr, supra note 15, at 48–49. 
123 See Rural Transportation Topic Guide Series Introduction, NAT’L AGING AND DISABILITY 
TRANSP. CTR. 1–2 (2012), https://www.nadtc.org/wp-content/uploads/NADTC-Rural-
Transportation-Topic-Guides-Introduction-PDF-version.pdf [https://perma.cc/VGV4-
KSQW] (noting that eleven million rural residents are disabled, two-thirds of rural 
residents are “older adults,” and “approximately 38 percent of rural residents live in areas 
with no public transportation”).  Modern public transportation systems often take 
payments based on reusable cards purchased by credit card.  Such payment systems make it 
possible to track the travel records of users.  See Diana Budds, A New Report Outlines 
Privacy Risks for the MTA’s Contactless Payment System, CURBED N.Y. (Oct. 3, 2019), 
https://ny.curbed.com/2019/10/3/20895736/mta-omny-privacy-surveillance-report 
[https://perma.cc/PW5Z-368Z]. 
124 Carol Atkinson-Palombo, Lorenzo Varone & Norman W. Garrick, Understanding the 
Surprising and Oversized Use of Ridesourcing Services in Poor Neighborhoods in New York 
City, 2673 TRANSP. RES. REC.: J. TRANSP. RES. REC. 185, 189–90 (2019); Laura Bliss, Lyft 
Is Reaching L.A. Neighborhoods Where Taxis Wouldn’t, CITYLAB (June 29, 2018), 
https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2018/06/lyft-is-reaching-la-neighborhoods-where-
taxis-wouldnt/563810 [https://perma.cc/NTE5-VVLB]. 
125 Bliss, supra note 124.  Racial discrimination against black riders still persists on 
ride-sharing services, although comparisons suggest that it is less than that experienced by 
riders of traditional taxi services.  Id. 
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themselves tracked by GPS systems.126 
A similar point can be made about smart home devices, which often 
collect detailed records concerning activities inside the home.127  
Internet-connected devices that can unlock doors, raise windows, turn on 
lights, or operate appliances via voice command are a luxury for most 
consumers.  But for disabled users, they can be essential for empowerment 
and independence.128  Such devices have become a crucial part of many 
people’s lives and relationships, dramatically expanding their economic, 
personal, and social possibilities.129  As Todd Stabelfeldt, a quadriplegic man 
with no movement below his shoulders, put it, smart home devices have given 
him “a lot of opportunities to demonstrate that I’m a quality man and I’m a 
man of integrity . . . [y]ou can be who you want to be.  This technology just 
allows you to be you in your story.”130  
Indeed, any technology may be indispensable to certain people even if it 
is unnecessary to most others.  Dependence on various technologies will vary 
based on people’s social, economic, and geographical contexts.  For a 
twenty-two--year-old in Atlanta, a certain app may be essential to 
participating in the social life of her area, while a similar person in Houston 
may have no need to use the app at all.131  Likewise, business managers may 
 
126 See, e.g., Dareh Gregorian, Appeals Court Rules City Can Monitor Taxis’ Movements with 
GPS, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 26, 2016), https://www.nydailynews.com/new-
york/appeals-court-rules-city-monitor-taxis-movements-gps-article-1.2767032 
[https://perma.cc/JY9T-873Q] (describing New York’s system for monitoring its taxis via 
GPS trackers and noting that it has operated since 2004). 
127 Tokson, supra note 11, at 52–55. 
128 Chiara A. Sottile, How a Smart Home Empowers People with Disabilities, NBCNEWS 
(May 9, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/how-smart-home-empowers-
people-disabilities-n756731 [https://perma.cc/Y9T5-EE7Z] (“For some people, doing 
something like turning on your lights or opening a blind or changing your thermostat 
might be seen as a convenience, but for others, that represents empowerment, and 
independence, and dignity.”). 
129 Id.130 Id. (describing how smart home devices have enhanced Stabelfeldt’s life and 
marriage, allowing him to operate independently and facilitating his job as an IT 
consultant). 
130 Id. (describing how smart home devices have enhanced Stabelfeldt’s life and marriage, 
allowing him to operate independently and facilitating his job as an IT consultant). 
131 See Donohue, supra note 63, at 382–83. 
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find that a networking service is a professional necessity, while accountants 
find it useless.  The potential for variance among differently situated people 
is enormous. 
Existing concepts of inescapability do not appear to take personal 
differences into account, a potentially serious flaw in their theoretical 
framework.132  Yet individualizing Fourth Amendment law is unlikely to be 
a viable solution either.  A Fourth Amendment standard that varies among 
individuals based on their unique circumstances and the technological and 
social practices of their localities would create doctrinal inconsistency, a flood 
of litigation, and massive administrability problems for courts.133  However 
as it is applied, inescapability would create substantial difficulties for courts 
and litigants. 
B. Harmful Incentives and Deadweight Loss 
One of the most serious drawbacks of inescapability is the incentives it 
creates for consumers.  When a technology is escapable, consumers are 
incentivized to avoid it in order to preserve their privacy rights.  But these 
technologies, while perhaps not essential to modern life, tend to be beneficial.  
Incentivizing people to avoid modern technology in order to prevent 
government monitoring creates “deadweight loss”—it causes people to 
reduce their use of beneficial technologies.134  The Fourth Amendment 
regime that Carpenter seems to endorse is a profoundly inefficient one. 
There are numerous technologies that are arguably optional but 
nonetheless greatly enhance users’ lives.  Google Maps, Waze, and other 
 
132 See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
133 In other contexts, the Court has taken pains to avoid “mak[ing] a crazy quilt of the 
Fourth Amendment” by allowing it to vary across different localities or based on the 
differing practices of telephone service providers.  Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 
(1979). 
134 A deadweight loss is a permanent loss to society that occurs when the equilibrium for a 
good or service is not Pareto optimal, i.e., when there are other potential allocations under 
which one actor in the system would be better off, and no one would be worse off.  See, 
e.g., R. PRESTON MCAFEE, INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 112–113, 182–83, 
198 (2006) (“The deadweight loss is important because it represents a loss to society much 
the same as if resources were simply thrown away or lost.”). 
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navigation apps are an important part of modern life,135 but are probably not 
inescapable in any meaningful sense.136  Alternative navigation methods like 
paper maps or asking directions are viable and widely available.  Navigation 
service providers generally collect and store data on users’ locations, creating 
a detailed history of their movements and activities.137  Government requests 
for such data have sharply increased in recent years.138  If users want to ensure 
that this sensitive information is not available to the government without a 
warrant, they would have to forego the use of navigation apps and use more 
privacy-protective alternatives.  But navigation apps greatly improve users’ 
ability to navigate, avoid traffic, and prevent getting lost.  Giving consumers 
incentives to stop using these apps would result in substantial societal harm, 
even if only a small percentage of navigation app users changed their 
 
135 RJ Reinhart, Most Americans Already Using Artificial Intelligence Products, GALLUP 
NEWS: ECONOMY (Mar. 6, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/228497/americans-
already-using-artificial-intelligence-products.aspx [https://perma.cc/5CYT-7TNR] 
(roughly 84% of Americans use navigation apps). 
136 It is difficult to say for certain, given the vagueness of the inescapability standard.  See 
supra subpart II.A. 
137 See, e.g., Andrew Couts, Terms & Conditions: Waze Is a Privacy Accident Waiting to 
Happen, DIGITAL TRENDS: MOBILE (Mar. 3, 2013), 
https://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/terms-conditions-waze-privacy-accident 
[https://perma.cc/4ZL6-WJSA]; Delete Maps History on Your iPhone, iPad, or iPod Touch, 
APPLE, https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT208651 [https://perma.cc/87D8-D64N] (last 
visited July 31, 2020); Delete Navigation History, WAZE HELP, 
https://support.google.com/waze/answer/6262570?hl=en&ref_topic=6262561[https://per
ma.cc/PVC6-KLPV] (last visited Jan. 27, 2020);; Jillian D’Onfro, Turning Off Location 
History Doesn’t Stop Google from Storing Where You’ve Been—Here’s How to Limit the Info It 
Logs, CNBC: TECH (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/13/how-to-stop-
google-from-storing-your-location-history.html [https://perma.cc/8QXG-A8PW]; Manage 
Your Location History, GOOGLE ACCOUNT HELP, 
https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/3118687?hl=en [https://perma.cc/ESP6-
RPVS] (last visited July 31, 2020).  However, effectively preventing the storage of one’s 
location information by Google Apps is difficult, and the time and effort required to 
manually delete one’s searches on the other apps is likely prohibitive.  See D’Onfro, supra 
note 137.  Location search histories are also useful, creating an accessible database of 
previously visited addresses and making navigation easier.  Speed and ease of use is 
particularly important for users navigating while driving. 
138 Zack Whittaker, Uber Reports a Sharp Rise in Government Demands for User Data, TECH 
CRUNCH (Nov. 20, 2019, 11:00 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2019/11/20/uber-
transparency-government-data [https://perma.cc/3MHF-MY63]. 




Roughly 6% of Americans are currently using a dating app and 21% 
have done so in the past.140  These apps are popular but would probably not 
be considered inescapable, even for single people.141  The majority of couples 
still meet through other means, generally through friends, in bars or 
restaurants, through coworkers, in school, or through family.142  Dating apps 
gather a vast quantity of user information, some of it quite intimate.143  For 
example, Tinder collects information on all of one’s matches, including their 
age and race; the location and timing of every online conversation between 
matches; which words one uses the most; how much time users spend looking 
at others’ pictures before swiping; data from Facebook on users’ “likes” and 
friend networks; and more.144 
In order to protect this information from government exposure, 
individuals would have to choose one of the alternative, offline methods for 
meeting potential dates.  But many individuals would incur substantial costs 
 
139 See Reinhart, supra note 135 (roughly 84% of Americans use navigation apps). 
140 J. Clement, Percentage of Online Users in the United States Who Have Used a Dating 
Website or App as of January 2019, STATISTA (April 29, 2020), 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/310256/us-online-dating-app-site-usage/ 
[https://perma.cc/3MHF-MY63].  I use “app” to refer to both smartphone applications 
and web-based applications on websites. 
141 Again, it is difficult to say for certain given the conceptual confusion of the 
inescapability principle.  See supra subpart II.A.  It could be argued that dating apps are 
essentially inescapable for young, single people without extensive friend groups or social 
networks, who have recently relocated to a new city, or who are recently divorced.  Again, 
an accurate assessment of escapability would require a granular, fact-based inquiry that 
would vary from person to person.  See supra section II.A.3. 
142 See Michael J. Rosenfeld et al., Disintermediating Your Friends: How Online Dating in 
the United States Displaces Other Ways of Meeting, 116 PNAS 17753, 17755 (2019). 
143 Thomas Germain, How Private Is Your Online Dating Data?, CONSUMER REPS. (Sept. 
21, 2019), https://www.consumerreports.org/privacy/how-private-is-your-online-dating-
data [https://perma.cc/X926-B8UV] (reporting that dating apps may collect data on one’s 
location, contacts, photos, network connections, time spent on profiles, and type of person 
preferred by a user).  Some dating apps generate revenue by using personal data to target 
ads or by selling it to third parties.  Id. 
144 Judith Duportail, I Asked Tinder for My Data. It Sent Me 800 Pages of My Deepest, 
Darkest Secrets, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 26, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/sep/26/tinder-personal-data-dating-app-
messages-hacked-sold [https://perma.cc/MRS3-QLDE]. 
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in doing so.  Their dating prospects may be significantly reduced, especially 
for LGBT+ persons or other individuals whose offline dating pool may be 
limited.145  The time and effort they spend seeking a dating partner might 
increase substantially.  Some may fail to meet their “soulmate”—millions of 
marriages have had their start with online dating.146  Even if the effects of 
foregoing dating apps are not typically so severe, a legal regime that 
discourages a popular and effective way for people to meet risks substantial 
societal loss.147 
A similar analysis could be done for those users who can avoid using 
ride-sharing apps and smart home devices.148  These technologies are not 
mandatory for many people, but they can nonetheless substantially enhance 
people’s lives.149  Ride-sharing apps may even save lives—most studies find 
that their use is correlated with a significant reduction in drunk driving 
 
145 See Anna Brown, Couples Who Meet Online Are More Diverse than Those Who Meet in 




146 Cf. Erin Duffin, Number of Marriages in the United States from 1990 to 2018, STATISTA 
(Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/195931/number-of-marriages-in-the-
united-states-since-1990 [https://perma.cc/V5KW-LL4A] (showing that over two million 
marriages occur per year in the United States); Rosenfeld et al., supra note 142, at 1 n.1, 
fig.1 (The rate of marriage for couples who meet online is very similar to that of couples 
meeting offline, and 40% of couples now meet online);. 
147 For a discussion of dating app information collection and the potential for deterrence, 
see Danielle Citron, The Data Death Penalty and Other Reforms for Protecting Intimate 
Information, 62 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2021). 
148 See supra section II.A.3. 
149 Ride-sharing apps can make transportation far easier for travelers or persons who do not 
own a car, reduce traffic, and may have unique social benefits for riders and drivers.  See 
Javier Alonso-Mora et al., On-demand High-capacity Ride-sharing via Dynamic Trip Vehicle 
Assignment, 114 PNAS 462, 467 (2017); Why Ridesharing Reaps Unexpected Benefits, 
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Nov. 14, 2019), 
https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/ridesharing-culture-benefits 
[https://perma.cc/L6LS-QZC2].  Smart homes have several benefits for consumers, 
including energy efficiency, convenience, improving security, entertainment, detecting 
faulty appliances, increasing property value, and improving health and quality of life.  See 
Charlie Wilson et al., Benefits and Risks of Smart Home Technologies, 103 ENERGY POL’Y 
72, 76–77 (2017). 
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fatalities.150  Courts should be reluctant to establish a legal regime that 
disincentivizes the use of potentially life-saving technologies among people 
concerned with fundamental rights to privacy. 
It might be objected that few people exist who are sufficiently concerned 
with privacy from government observation to forego the useful technologies 
described above.  But this is hardly reassuring.  Rather, it demonstrates that 
the inescapability standard is behaviorally unrealistic and inconsistent with 
meaningful Fourth Amendment protection in the digital age.  It is not 
reasonable to ask people to forego profoundly beneficial technologies in order 
to preserve their rights.  The likely upshot of such a standard is that many 
consumers will continue to use these technologies and face comprehensive 
government surveillance without constitutional safeguards. 
C. The Normative Implications of Inescapability 
A central goal of the reasonable expectation of privacy test is to protect 
whatever society considers private.151  Thus the Court has typically 
safeguarded intimate places and information while declining to protect less 
sensitive things.152  Yet inescapability does an especially poor job of protecting 
sensitive data.  An inescapability standard would often expose private data to 
government scrutiny while shielding data that is relatively non-sensitive.153 
Optional technologies frequently capture the most intimate forms of 
 
150 Jacey Fortin, Does Uber Really Prevent Drunken Driving? It Depends on the Study, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/business/uber-drunk-
driving-prevention.html [https://perma.cc/Z6C4-8JRZ] (noting that studies 
predominantly show a correlation between Uber services and lower rates of alcohol-related 
accidents). 
151 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“My 
understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold 
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy 
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”); id. at 351−52 (holding that telephone conversations are protected by the 
Fourth Amendment in light of the “vital role that the public telephone has come to play in 
private communication”). 
152 Tokson, supra note 11, at 13–16. 
153 For a detailed discussion of the concept of sensitive data, see Paul Ohm, Sensitive 
Information, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1128–1132 (2015). 
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data.  Smart speakers record sounds inside the home and transmit those 
recordings to third party service providers.154  Internet-connected beds, 
appliances, and personal items can record and transmit extremely intimate 
details about people’s lives.155  Health apps and “femtech” services collect 
extensive, personal data about users’ bodies, prescriptions, habits, and 
preferences.156  Smart door locks such as Amazon Ring record all comings 
and goings to a home and videotape all of a resident’s activities on their porch 
or front yard.157  DNA analysis services can obtain detailed information about 
an individual’s genetic makeup, paternity, future health prospects, and 
more.158  These technologies are escapable for most consumers, yet exposing 
the sensitive data they collect to government observation subverts 
fundamental Fourth Amendment values.159 
 
154 Raphael Davidian, Alexa and Third Parties’ Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 54 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. ONLINE 58, 59–60 (2017) (describing how smart speakers record and 
process requests and other speech from their users); Austin Carr et al., Silicon Valley Is 
Listening to Your Most Intimate Moments, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 11, 2019), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-12-11/silicon-valley-got-millions-to-let-
siri-and-alexa-listen-in [https://perma.cc/K93B-Y5WJ] (discussing the “recordings of 
intimate moments inside people’s homes” and other personal data captured by Amazon’s 
Alexa and listened to by its employees). 
155 See, e.g., Tim Bajarin, The Next Big Thing for Tech: The Internet of Everything, TIME 
(Jan. 13, 2014), http://time.com/539/the-next-big-thing-for-tech-the-internet-of-
everything/ [https://perma.cc/8R96-PJH5]; Bree Fowler, Gifts that Snoop? The Internet of 
Things Is Wrapped in Privacy Concerns, CONSUMER REPORTS (Dec. 13, 2017), 
https://www.consumerreports.org/internet-of-things/gifts-that-snoop-internet-of-things-
privacy-concerns/ [https://perma.cc/QD6H-5PCJ]; Melia Robinson, This Sex Wearable 
that’s Being Falsely Marketed as a ‘Smart Condom’ Is Kind of Ridiculous, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 
3, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/smart-condom-icon-sex-wearable-2017-3 
[https://perma.cc/VF4Q-VVET]. 
156 See Citron, supra note 147(manuscript at 5). 
157 Rani Molla, How Amazon’s Ring Is Creating a Surveillance Network with Video Doorbells, 
VOX (Jan. 28, 2020, 12:08 PM), https://www.vox.com/2019/9/5/20849846/amazon-ring-
explainer-video-doorbell [https://perma.cc/NV9J-XG9X]. 
158 Andelka M. Phillips, Only a Click Away—DTC Genetics for Ancestry, Health, Love … 
and More: A View of the Business and Regulatory Landscape, 8 APPLIED & TRANSLATIONAL 
GENOMICS 16, 16–20 (2016). 
159 For a discussion of those values, see Tokson, supra note 118, at 635 & n.279 (discussing 
historical sources on the broader purposes of the Fourth Amendment, including the 
protection of privacy, property, and liberty).  See also supra notes 127–129 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of how smart home technologies may be essential to 
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At the same time, many difficult-to-escape technologies may produce 
less sensitive information or information that is especially useful in detecting 
crime.  Online banking or electronic wire transfers may be an inescapable 
part of modern financial life, but the information they produce is rarely 
intimate and is often essential to detecting white-collar crimes.160  Utility bills 
that record the electricity or water usage of a home are largely unavoidable 
but typically reveal only very general and nonsensitive information.161  
Similarly, giving one’s subscriber information to online service providers is 
likely inescapable because it is usually necessary for internet access.162  Yet 
subscriber information is not itself especially sensitive, mostly consisting of 
data such as one’s name, address, and telephone number.163  Inescapability 
 
some disabled persons. 
160 See Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 476, 509–10 (2011) (explaining that the Supreme Court eliminated the 
warrant requirement for financial records following the rise of difficult-to-detect 
white-collar crimes). 
161 Smart meters and smart utilities may record more granular data about energy usage, but 
traditional utility metering reveals only the overall energy consumption of a household.  See 
Deirdre K. Mulligan et al., Privacy in the Smart Grid: An Information Flow Analysis, CAL. 
INST. ENERGY & ENV’T 1, 5–6 (2011), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1815605 
[https://perma.cc/EQ5U-569T] (comparing the household information revealed by smart 
meters versus traditional metering systems). 
162 See, e.g., Comcast Customer Privacy Notice, COMCAST, https://cdn.comcast.com/-
/media/Images/www_xfinity_com/Corporate/PrivacyPolicyUniLegalStndENG.pdf?rev=19
ecf433-a422-4978-ac4a-b7e17ffe8801&la=en [https://perma.cc/G53K-BYUM] (last 
updated Jan. 1, 2018) (explaining that a customer’s name, address, email address, and 
phone number are collected upon an account’s creation). 
163 See Matthew J. Tokson, The Content/Envelope Distinction in Internet Law, 50 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 2105, 2122 (2009).  To be sure, this data can implicate privacy when it is 
used to de-anonymize internet users.  In any event, this data generally receives minimal 
statutory protections compared to communications content, location information, and 
other forms of digital data, and courts have virtually always declared it outside of the 
Fourth Amendment’s scope, both before and after Carpenter.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2) 
(2018); United States v. Morel, 922 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2019); United States v. Perrine, 
518 F.3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Hambrick, No. 99-4793, 2000 
WL 1062039, at *3 (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 2000) (per curiam); United States v. Maclin, 393 F. 
Supp. 3d 701, 708 (N.D. Ohio 2019); United States v. Tolbert, No. CR 14-3761 JCH, 
2019 WL 2006464, at *3 (D.N.M. May 7, 2019); United States v. Sherr, 400 F. Supp. 2d 
843, 848 (D. Md. 2005).  See also Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 
(2018) (providing little protection for subscriber information, which can be obtained via 
subpoena).  This data is frequently obtained by the government in cases involving child 
DRAFT - Forthcoming, 105 Cornell Law Review __ (2021) 
  
34 
would privilege these less sensitive forms of information over the intimate 
data generated by more escapable technologies.164  In many cases, an 
inescapability standard would produce normatively undesirable outcomes 
and fail to adequately protect privacy. 
D. Inescapability and Precedent 
Aside from its conceptual problems, the inescapability standard 
threatens to make a mess of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  It is directly 
contradicted by several Supreme Court precedents still in force.165  Indeed, 
the Carpenter opinion reaffirms two of these precedents at the same time it 
purportedly establishes the importance of inescapability.166 
In Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that people have no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone numbers that they dial.167  In 
United States v. Miller, it ruled that they have no privacy in their bank 
records.168  In neither case was the disclosure of information to a third party 
any more escapable than the disclosures in Carpenter.169  Telephones were 
certainly a vital part of modern life by the time Smith was decided—the Court 
 
pornography and online harassment.  See, e.g., Sherr, 400 F. Supp. at 846; Freedman v. 
Am. Online, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 174, 179–183 (D. Conn. 2005). 
164 See supra text accompanying notes 154–158.  Note that, under Professor Kerr’s 
preferred application of Carpenter, subscriber information would not be protected despite 
meeting the requirement of inescapability because it would fail under a separate 
requirement that protected, third-party records be uniquely digital.  See Kerr, supra note 
15, at 16, 47. 
165 See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (holding that people had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their household trash placed in bags and left for 
pickup, despite the potentially inescapable nature of trash disposal in areas where 
individuals cannot lawfully bring their own trash to a landfill); Smith v. Maryland, 442 
U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not protect dialed 
phone numbers); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976) (holding that the 
Fourth Amendment does not apply to bank records). 
166 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018) (“We do not disturb the 
application of Smith and Miller . . . .”). 
167 Smith, 442 U.S. at 745–46. 
168 Miller, 425 U.S. at 442–43. 
169 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220. 
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itself had said so in a prior case.170  And the use of a bank is a necessary part 
of most people’s lives.171  These cases have been widely criticized,172 yet the 
Court did not critique them or invoke stare decisis in upholding them.173 
There are a few possible explanations for the Court’s refusal to overturn 
or criticize these cases.  One is that the Court does not consider inescapability 
an important factor, let alone a decisive one.174  The Carpenter opinion 
devotes substantially more discussion to the deeply revealing and extensive 
nature of cell phone tracking than it does to inescapability.175  It distinguishes 
 
170 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (noting “the vital role that the public 
telephone has come to play in private communication”). 
171 Moreover, bank customers are unable to prevent banks from making and retaining 
records of their financial transactions.  The Bank Secrecy Act requires banks to, among 
other things, make “a microfilm or other reproduction of each check, draft, or similar 
instrument” presented for payment or deposit and retain these and other records for a 
period of up to six years.  12 U.S.C. § 1829b(d)–(g) (2018).  The Court expressly ruled in 
Miller that this compulsory record keeping did not give rise to any Fourth Amendment 
right for bank customers, who could not lawfully avoid scrutiny of their records.  Miller, 
425 U.S. at 441–42. 
172 See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Fourth Amendment Protection for Shared 
Privacy Rights in Stored Transactional Data, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 211, 242–44 (2006); Jed 
Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 113–14 (2008); Daniel J. Solove, 
Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 
1136–38 (2002). 
173 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.  Neither did the Court question the rule of Stoner v. 
California, where the Court held that hotel guests have a Fourth Amendment right in their 
rooms despite giving permission to the cleaning staff to enter the room in the performance 
of their duties.  See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964).  Observation of a hotel 
room by cleaning staff is easily avoidable in most situations; the guest need only place a 
“Do Not Disturb” sign on the door to prevent it.  Yet hotel rooms are universally 
protected, no matter what steps the guest takes or fails to take to prevent observation by 
third parties.  Finsel v. Hartshorn, 200 F. Supp. 2d 960, 967 (C.D. Ill. 2002) (noting that 
“[i]t is beyond question . . . that an unconsented police entry into a residential unit, be it a 
house or an apartment or a hotel or motel room, constitutes a search within the meaning of 
Katz v. United States” (alteration in original) (quoting 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & 
SEIZURE § 2.3(b) at 474–75 (3d ed. 1996)), aff'd sub nom. Finsel v. Cruppenink, 326 F.3d 
903 (7th Cir. 2003); People v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 831, 848 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2006) (drawing on Stoner to find a Fourth Amendment right against police inspections of 
dorm rooms). 
174 Cf. supra subpart I.C. (discussing interpretations of Carpenter that consider 
inescapability either an important factor or a requirement for Fourth Amendment 
protections). 
175 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216–19.  The Court’s relative lack of discussion of 
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Smith and Miller by noting that those cases emphasized the nonrevealing 
nature of the information obtained.176  It may be that the intimacy, extent, 
and low cost of cell phone location tracking are what mattered to the Court, 
 
inescapability is notable in light of the fact that Carpenter’s attorneys devoted several pages 
to the topic.  Brief for Petitioner at 39−44, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct 2206 
(2018) (No. 16-402) .  They argued that Carpenter had little choice but to use a cell phone 
and to disclose its location to his service provider.  Id. at 39−40.  They pointed out that 
nearly all American adults own a cell phone and that cell phones automatically transmit 
location data to cell phone companies.  Id. at 39−44.  They note that alternative means of 
vocal communication are disappearing, as a “majority of American homes now do not have 
a landline telephone, as residents rely exclusively on cell phones.”  Id. at 40.  Payphones 
have likewise shrunk to near irrelevance over the past two decades.  See id.  They note that 
cell phones are often the exclusive means through which people contact first responders in 
a medical emergency, report a crime, or to seek roadside assistance.  Id. at 41.  Roughly 
seventy percent of 911 calls are placed from cell phones.  Id.  Cell phones generate and 
transmit location data as long as they are switched on.  Id. at 42.  Location privacy settings 
on a smartphone have no impact on the transmission of cell signals that permit 
tower-based location tracking.  Id.  “There is no way to avoid the aggregation and retention 
of this location information short of turning off or disabling the phone.”  Id.  Several 
amicus briefs raised similar arguments about inescapability.  See, e.g., Brief for Electronic 
Frontier Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 22, Carpenter v. 
United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16-402) (contending that “owning and 
carrying a phone is hardly a choice at all” and “cell-phone users have no choice but to 
reveal certain information to their cellular provider”); Brief for Scholars of the History and 
Original Meaning of the Fourth Amendment as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 12, 
26, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16-402) (arguing that cell 
phones are “essential tool[s] of modern life” and that people have no choice over whether 
CSLI is collected); Brief for Michael Varco as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 
17, 20, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16-402) (arguing that 
petitioner could have avoided having CSLI data collected by using internet-based apps or 
leaving his cellular phone at home); Brief for National District Attorneys Association as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 17, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 
(2018) (No. 16-402) (arguing that petitioner could have restricted the conveyance of CSLI 
by using apps to complete calls, putting his phone in airplane mode, or turning it off). 
176 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219–20 (describing Smith and Miller); see Smith v. Maryland, 
442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979) (noting that “pen registers do not acquire the contents of 
communications. . . .  Neither the purport of any communication between the caller and 
the recipient of the call, their identities, nor whether the call was even completed is 
disclosed.” (emphasis omitted)); Miller, 425 U.S. at 440–42 (“On their face, the 
documents subpoenaed here are not respondent’s ‘private papers[]’ . . .  The checks are not 
confidential communications but negotiable instruments to be used in commercial 
transactions.”) 
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while inescapability did little or no work in resolving the case.177 
Another possibility is that the Court failed to recognize the conflict 
between its precedents, creating a jurisprudence of confusion and 
unpredictability.  Lower courts looking for guidance on how to apply an 
inescapability standard have only the brief discussion in Carpenter and several 
contradictory precedents to consult.  This doctrinal confusion adds to the 
profound conceptual confusion surrounding inescapability, making it even 
more difficult for lower courts to apply consistently.178 
Neither of these possibilities supports the use of an inescapability 
standard going forward.  Indeed, the conceptual, normative, and doctrinal 
flaws of inescapability suggest that courts should look elsewhere for a Fourth 
Amendment standard.  The next Part explores ways that courts can minimize 
the use of inescapability and examines alternative methods of applying the 
Fourth Amendment to new technologies. 
 
III. ESCAPING INESCAPABILITY 
In light of the issues described above, this Part explores several alternative 
approaches that avoid the use of inescapability.  Lower courts can plausibly 
focus on other factors and minimize inescapability when applying Carpenter, 
as part of the interpretative process that inevitably follows a major new 
Supreme Court decision.  More broadly, scholars have proposed alternative 
regimes that would transform Fourth Amendment law and replace the 
current “reasonable expectation of privacy” framework.  Most of these 
approaches would offer more protection and clarity than an inescapability 
standard.  This Part discusses the advantages and disadvantages of these 
alternatives and examines how they would address issues of third-party 
disclosure and digital surveillance. 
 
177 See Tokson, supra note 97, at 11–12 (describing the importance of intimacy, amount, 
and cost in virtually all of the Court’s reasonable expectation of privacy cases, including 
Carpenter). 
178 See supra subparts II.A−B. 
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It is worth noting that, under most of these approaches, concepts like 
the widespread disclosure or publication of one’s information may still be 
relevant to Fourth Amendment privacy.  If a person posts their data to 
Facebook or publishes it in a newspaper, that is likely to impact how 
revealing,179 or intimate,180 or protected by law181 that information will be.  
When disclosure is limited to a single counterparty, however, its relevance is 
likely to be limited.182  Moreover, none of the alternative approaches turns 
on whether a person had the ability to avoid the relevant transaction or 
disclosure.183  That assessment carries with it the substantial drawbacks and 
decision costs described above. 
A. Refining the Carpenter Framework 
Supreme Court precedents, especially important ones, require 
interpretation.184  They do not resolve every possible issue or ambiguity but 
leave it to future courts and other legal actors to fully articulate their 
meaning.185  In many cases, the Supreme Court expressly relies on lower court 
interpretations of its prior decisions.186  The Court also regularly consults 
scholars’ interpretations and critiques of its prior cases.187 
 
179 See infra subpart III.A. 
180 See infra subsection III.B.4(b). 
181 See infra section III.B.2. 
182 See infra subpart III.B.  For a theoretical discussion of the relevance of the extent of 
dissemination, see Lior Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 919, 973–975 (2005) (arguing that limited disclosures of information do not 
eliminate privacy and detailing how social network analysis can aid courts in assessing the 
extent of public disclosure in cases involving wider dissemination). 
183 See infra subpart III.B. 
184 Thus Supreme Court opinions interpret and apply past opinions while providing 
material for future courts to interpret in an ongoing process of precedential interpretation. 
185 Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921, 
925–26 (2016). 
186 See infra notes 204–206 and accompanying text. 
187 See infra note 208.  Legal scholarship appears to be especially influential in difficult 
cases and those in which the Court alters precedent.  Lee Petherbridge & David L. 
Schwartz, An Empirical Assessment of the Supreme Court’s Use of Legal Scholarship, 106 NW. 
U. L. REV. 995, 998−99 (2012) (noting that the Supreme Court is more likely to cite 
scholarship in cases with indicia of difficulty and where decisions alter precedent). 
DRAFT - Forthcoming, 105 Cornell Law Review __ (2021) 
 
39 
This “precedential dialogue” allows the Supreme Court to assess the 
various interpretations of its rulings and observe their practical 
consequences.188  It also presents an opportunity for courts and scholars to 
influence the law’s development.189  Broad Supreme Court opinions can be 
viewed as a kind of delegation to lower courts, providing them with space for 
interpretive flexibility.190 
The Carpenter opinion is notably cryptic regarding how courts should 
address digital surveillance in the future.191  It overtly declined to address any 
form of information beyond historical cell phone location data.192  The Court 
instead chose to proceed incrementally so as not to “embarrass the future” 
with a sweeping but erroneous decision.193  Nonetheless, the impact of the 
Court’s ruling that people can retain a Fourth Amendment right in 
information owned by third parties is potentially massive.194  The 
considerations identified by the Court—the revealing, extensive, inescapable 
nature of cell phone tracking—are broadly applicable to digital surveillance 
generally.195  This is the archetypal example of a case that calls for further 
development and interpretation.196 
An important part of that development will be the minimization or 
abandonment of inescapability in cases applying Carpenter.  Inescapability 
 
188 Re, supra note 185, at 927. 
189 See infra notes 204–206, 208 and accompanying text. 
190 Re, supra note 185, at 926. 
191 Strahilevitz & Tokson, supra note 63. 
192 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018) (“We do not express a view 
on matters not before us: real-time CSLI or ‘tower dumps’ . . . .  We do not disturb the 
application of Smith and Miller or call into question conventional surveillance techniques 
and tools, such as security cameras.  Nor do we address other business records that might 
incidentally reveal location information.”). 
193 Id. (quoting Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 300 (1944)). 
194 Ohm, supra note 8, at 385. 
195 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223. 
196 Caminker, supra note 16, at 460 (stating that Carpenter’s “amorphous nature . . . now 
gives judges license, if not permission, to deviate, to innovate, and even to anticipate 
technological change”); Re, supra note 185, at 947 (“[T]he existence of ambiguity in a 
higher court precedent can itself be regarded as a meaningful message to lower 
courts . . . . disuniformity can sometimes be helpful in fostering ‘percolation’—that is, 
experimentation and reflection on what might otherwise be stale legal rules.”). 
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should be minimized for the reasons described above: it is difficult to 
administer, conceptually confused, oblivious to disability and difference, 
inefficient and socially harmful, and normatively undesirable.197  Moreover, 
minimizing inescapability reflects a plausible reading of Carpenter itself.  As 
noted above, the Court’s discussion of inescapability is relatively brief, while 
the bulk of its opinion is concerned with the intimate, voluminous nature of 
cell phone tracking.198  The Court describes in detail the serious threats to 
privacy that cell phone tracking poses.199  Given this emphasis, it is unlikely 
that the Court would permit the government to collect revealing or extensive 
data at low cost regardless of how escapable it was.200  Nor is inescapability 
compatible with the Court’s other Fourth Amendment precedents.201 
Lower courts applying Carpenter can plausibly assess surveillance based 
on its revealing and extensive nature while ignoring inescapability or 
mentioning it only in passing.202  Indeed, some courts have already ignored 
inescapability when applying Carpenter.203  Moreover, lower courts have 
successfully narrowed or modified constitutional doctrines in several similar 
contexts.204  For example, the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test is 
 
197 See supra Part II. 
198 See supra notes 175–177 and accompanying text.  
199 See Tokson, supra note 97, at 10 n.78. 
200 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217–19 (describing at length the privacy harms that may 
result from cell phone tracking); id. (noting the ubiquity of cell phone use); Tokson, supra 
note 97, at 10 n.78, 13 (noting the ubiquity of cell phone use). 
201 See supra subpart II.D. 
202 See Re, supra note 185, at 942 (discussing the plausibility of a lower court’s narrowing 
interpretation of a search incident to arrest precedent). 
203 Compare United States v. Howard, No. 1:19-CR-54-WKW, 2019 WL 6048885, at *6 
(M.D. Ala. Nov. 15, 2019) (assessing GPS tracking without addressing inescapability), and 
People v. Tafoya, 2019 COA 176, ¶¶ 42–48 (holding that video surveillance of a suspect’s 
curtilage was a Fourth Amendment search on the basis of factors other than inescapability), 
with United States v. Hood, 920 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 2019) (holding that the government 
could warrantlessly collect IP address data associated with a messaging app because the app 
was optional and escapable), and State v. Martinez, 570 S.W.3d 278, 288 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 2019) (holding that a blood draw of an accident victim was a search because the 
patient could not have escaped it). 
204 After Boumediene v. Bush held that prisoners held in Guantanamo Bay could file writs of 
habeas corpus and secure “meaningful” review of their detentions, the D.C. Circuit 
repeatedly construed detainees’ rights of review narrowly.  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 
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nominally a two-prong test, but its first prong, asking whether a person had 
a subjective expectation of privacy, is largely ignored by lower courts.205  Most 
courts do not mention it, and most that do mention it do not apply it.  Courts 
could similarly excise inescapability from any application of Carpenter to 
digital information.206 
Lower courts207 and scholars208 should recognize the flaws of the 
 
723, 779 (2008); Re, supra note 185, at 963−64; Stephen I. Vladeck, The D.C. Circuit 
After Boumediene, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1451 (2011).  Lower court decisions 
interpreted Supreme Court precedents to require only a preponderance of the evidence 
standard for detention, to permit the use of hearsay evidence, and to limit remedies for 
unlawfully held detainees.  Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011); Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 
2010) (suggesting that the burden for continued detention might be even less than a 
preponderance of the evidence), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1001 (2011); Vladeck, supra note 
204, at 1476−88 (describing the relevant remedies cases).  The Supreme Court has largely 
accepted these modifications.  See Vladeck, supra, at 1475; Lyle Denniston, Ex-judge: 
Boumediene Is Being “Gutted”, SCOTUSBLOG (July 17, 2012, 3:54 PM), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2012/07/ex-judge-boumediene-is-being-gutted 
[https://perma.cc/3KCS-55HS]. 
In Saucier v. Katz, the Supreme Court commanded lower courts to resolve qualified 
immunity cases by first assessing whether a constitutional right was violated and only then 
assessing qualified immunity.  Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001).  Many lower 
courts declined to enforce this rule, while others criticized the rule aggressively.  Matthew 
Tokson, Judicial Resistance and Legal Change, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 955 (2015).  Eight 
years later, the Supreme Court reversed its prior decision, citing lower court confusion and 
criticism.  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 234–35 (2009). 
205 Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective Expectations, 82 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 113, 114 (2015). 
206 Alternatively, courts might minimize, narrow, and/or critique inescapability even if they 
consider it binding law.  For examples of courts minimizing or successfully critiquing 
aspects of Supreme Court law, see supra note 204 and accompanying text. 
207 See supra notes 202–206 and accompanying text. 
208 Scholars likewise play a substantial role in interpreting and critiquing ambiguous 
Supreme Court standards.  In areas ranging from the Establishment Clause to contempt of 
court, the Court has acknowledged and often ruled in accordance with academic criticism 
of its prior decisions.  Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2081 (2019) 
(noting that the Lemon test has been “questioned by a diverse roster of scholars” and 
declining to apply the test to evaluate longstanding monuments using religious imagery); 
Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827 n.3 (1994) 
(“Numerous scholars have criticized as unworkable the traditional distinction between civil 
and criminal contempt.”).  It often rules in line with the scholarly consensus in these cases.  
Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2081, 2089 (ruling in favor of a longstanding monument, 
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inescapability standard.  In light of these flaws, Carpenter is best read to create 
a standard that focuses on the revealing and detailed nature of digital 
surveillance.  Surveillance that reveals “the privacies of life” and “provides an 
all-encompassing record” of a user’s activities should be governed by the 
Fourth Amendment, regardless of escapability.209 
B. Alternative Models of Fourth Amendment Protection 
Although Carpenter forges a new path for Fourth Amendment law in the 
digital era, it does so by refining the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test 
that courts have used since the late 1960s.210  That test has been criticized as 
tautological, confusing, and underprotective, in addition to its difficulties 
with data held by third parties.211  In recent years, scholars have proposed 
various alternative regimes for determining the Fourth Amendment’s scope.  
These approaches have their own advantages and disadvantages, but each of 
them would avoid using inescapability to determine Fourth Amendment 
rights.  This section explores these alternatives and assesses how each would 
apply to government surveillance of digital information held by third parties. 
1. The Normative Approach 
Rather than attempting to assess people’s expectations of privacy, courts 
 
contrary to what the Lemon test might direct); Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 
2206, 2262 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court’s limitation of the 
third-party doctrine was bolstered by vigorous scholarly criticism of the doctrine); see 
Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1052 n.10 (2017) (noting scholarly criticism of a Texas 
standard and overruling that standard). 
209 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217. 
210 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (“We have recently held that . . . wherever an 
individual may harbor a reasonable ‘expectation of privacy,’ he is entitled to be free from 
unreasonable government intrusion.” (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring))). 
211 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring); William Baude & 
James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 
1824–25 (2016); Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth 
Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 132–39 (2002); 
Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1511 (2010). 
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might take a more directly normative approach, asking what protections the 
Fourth Amendment should provide to people regardless of societal 
expectations.212  For example, courts could apply a balancing test analogous 
to those used throughout First Amendment law, weighing the benefits of a 
type of  government surveillance against its harms.213  In prior work, I have 
offered an account of the core normative considerations involved: the benefits 
of crime detection and prevention, and the harms of deterring lawful 
activities, impairing relationships, and inflicting direct psychological 
injury.214  The Supreme Court has itself engaged in normative balancing in 
prior Fourth Amendment cases, albeit in a rudimentary manner.215  Likewise, 
some lower courts applying Carpenter have taken a normative approach, 
focusing directly on the privacy harms and chilling effects of government 
surveillance in novel Fourth Amendment contexts.216 
A normative balancing approach would have several advantages, 
 
212 Aya Gruber, Garbage Pails and Puppy Dog Tails: Is That What Katz Is Made of?, 41 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 781, 795 (2008) (“At some level the constitutional inquiry must concern 
not just what society actually believes is private, but what we ought to be able to regard as 
private . . . .”); Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in Public, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 141, 155–57 
(2014) (proposing a normative regime based on whether surveilled behavior is of private or 
public concern); Olivier Sylvain, Failing Expectations: Fourth Amendment Doctrine in the 
Era of Total Surveillance, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 485, 522 (2014) (arguing that courts 
should reject expectation-based tests and adopt a more normative approach); Matthew 
Tokson, The Normative Fourth Amendment, 104 MINN. L. REV. 741, 743 (2019) 
(proposing a normative balancing test for Fourth Amendment Searches). 
213 Tokson, supra note 212. 
214 Id.  My proposed test would also consider whether the same law enforcement goals 
could be achieved via a less invasive practice.  Id. at 768; see also Susan Freiwald, First 
Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3 (discussing factors that 
make government observation especially worthy of regulation); Henderson, supra note 43, 
at 985–1014 (listing considerations that lower courts have found relevant to privacy). 
215 See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527 (1984) (balancing a prisoner’s privacy 
interests against the government’s interests in prison administration). 
216 See United States v. Chavez, No. 3:18-CR-00311-MOC-DCK-3, 2019 WL 5849895, 
at *6 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 7, 2019) (evaluating the vital role that social media plays as a 
conduit for intimate or political speech and finding that the Fourth Amendment protects 
nonpublic Facebook communications from government surveillance); United States v. 
Moore-Bush, 381 F. Supp. 3d 139, 148–49 (D. Mass. 2019), as amended (June 4, 2019) 
(discussing at length surveillance’s chilling effects on religious, intimate, and social 
activities in evaluating pole camera surveillance of a suspect). 
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including its adaptability to new surveillance technologies and social 
contexts, consideration of discrimination-based harms, and ability to address 
programmatic surveillance.217  Its drawbacks include the relative difficulty of 
administering a balancing test and the potential for unpredictability when 
addressing novel issues.218 
In contrast to an inescapability standard, this approach would likely 
protect most forms of personal digital information held by third parties.219  
When government observation of such information would cause serious 
privacy harms—as with emails, smart home devices, websurfing data, IP 
addresses, and more—a normative approach would generally require the 
government to secure a warrant.220  In areas where data is less sensitive and 
especially important to crime detection, such as noncredit-card banking 
information, the Fourth Amendment would likely not apply.221 
2. The Positive Law Regime 
Courts could rely on other sources of law to determine the Fourth 
Amendment’s scope.  Under a positive law approach, the Amendment would 
apply whenever an official commits an act that would be unlawful or tortious 
if done by a private citizen.222  The Supreme Court has looked to positive law 
 
217 Tokson, supra note 212, at 778–86. 
218 Id. at 786–95.  Note that the current reasonable expectation of privacy standard suffers 
from the same flaws, and a normative replacement would likely be no harder to administer 
or more unpredictable than the current test, which is famously confusing and 
unpredictable in its application.  See Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth 
Amendment and the Limits of Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST. 
JOHNS L. REV. 1149, 1153–58, 1166 (1998); Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Fourth Amendment 
Reasonableness After Carpenter, 128 YALE L.J.F. 943, 958–60 (2019); see also George M. 
Dery III, Failing to Keep “Easy Cases Easy”: Florida v. Jardines Refuses to Reconcile 
Inconsistencies in Fourth Amendment Privacy Law by Instead Focusing on Physical Trespass, 47 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 451, 471–79 (2014) (discussing the flaws and inconsistencies of the 
Court’s current property-based subtest).  
219 Tokson, supra note 212, at 801–08. 
220 See id. 
221 Id. at 804–05. 
222 See Baude & Stern, supra note 211, at 1831−32; Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, 
Decentralizing Fourth Amendment Search Doctrine, 107 KY. L.J. 169, 210–11 (2019). 
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in a handful of prior Fourth Amendment cases.223 
Such an approach would be predictable where existing law is clear and 
would benefit from legislators’ informational advantages and ability to 
regulate comprehensively.224  On the other hand, a positive law regime would 
often base the Fourth Amendment on considerations that are irrelevant to 
privacy, would remove limits to the political branches’ ability to compromise 
citizens’ rights, and might underprotect privacy due to the high enactment 
costs of legislation.225 
A positive law approach would likely protect digital information held by 
third parties in many situations, though it is difficult to say for certain due to 
the ambiguous application of positive law in this context.  The leading 
positive law proposal would apply the Fourth Amendment not only to 
violations of law but also when an official uses the government’s unique legal 
authority to obtain information.226  This would presumably prohibit grand 
jury and administrative subpoenas, although civil subpoenas available to any 
citizen would likely be allowed.227  Informal government requests for data or 
documents are more difficult to assess.228  While requests from a government 
 
223 The Court typically invokes positive law when finding no constitutional violation in 
situations when police behavior was otherwise lawful or did not affect the defendant’s 
property.  See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989) (plurality opinion) (noting that 
the government flew a helicopter at a lawful height above a defendant’s house); Rakas v. 
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 129 (1978) (finding that Petitioner could assert no property right or 
possessory interest in the items searched).  The Court does not appear to have ever found a 
Fourth Amendment right on the basis that the police violated applicable positive law.  Cf. 
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (holding that people have no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their trash left on the curb and rejecting the idea that state law 
could dictate the scope of the Fourth Amendment). 
224 Baude & Stern, supra note 211, at 1851−53; Tokson, supra note 50, at 192−93.  Many 
Fourth Amendment cases will present issues that are unresolved in existing statutes or 
precedents.  See Tokson, supra note 212, at 795–96.  Government surveillance practices 
like drug-sniffing dogs or satellite-based observation do not arise in litigation between 
private parties, and the privacy tort cases that do arise typically rest on an open-ended 
reasonableness standard that is not well developed.  Id. at 796.   
225 Richard M. Re, The Positive Law Floor, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 313, 330−31 (2016); 
Tokson, supra note 212, at 796–98. 
226 Baude & Stern, supra note 211, at 1831−32. 
227 See FED. R. CIV. P. 45. 
228 Tokson, supra note 212, at 798 n.331. 
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official would likely be far more influential than those from a private party, 
it is unclear whether a positive law approach would take such nonlegal factors 
into account.229 
3. The Historical Approach 
Courts could interpret the Fourth Amendment as Justice Thomas 
proposed in his dissent in Carpenter, limiting it to certain types of tangible 
property owned by an individual.230  Under this approach, the Amendment 
would apply only to one’s person, houses, papers, and effects.231  Intangible 
things, other types of property, and records and data owned by other parties 
would not be covered.232 
This approach would be conceptually clear and would comport well with 
historical Fourth Amendment practices.233  It would mean, however, that 
nearly all information disclosed to a third party would be unprotected, along 
with one’s conversations and nonresidential real property.234  This approach 
would be easier to administer than an inescapability standard but would offer 
 
229 Re, supra note 225, at 324.  Re criticizes Baude and Stern’s positive law model for 
directing judges to imagine a police officer stripped of official authority, without 
accounting for the social authority that officers also possess.  Id.  Baude and Stern posit 
that the positive law model might be loosened to incorporate some effects of official 
authority, but appear to limit this to “hidden legal privilege.”  Baude & Stern, supra note 
211, at 1865−66. 
230 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2238–39 (2018) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting); Jeffrey Bellin, Fourth Amendment Textualism, 118 MICH. L. REV. 233, 260–62 
(2019). 
231 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (establishing a right in “persons, houses, papers, and 
effects”). 
232 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2238 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
233 The idea that people can only assert their own property rights in Fourth Amendment is 
often framed as textualist, but the text of the Fourth Amendment uses plural terms such as 
“the people” and “their” persons, houses, papers, and effects.  While historical practice is 
consistent with a Fourth Amendment limited to trespasses on an individual claimant’s 
property, the text itself is consistent with a broader, collective right.  See generally David 
Gray, Collective Standing Under the Fourth Amendment, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 77 (2018) 
(arguing for a more expansive interpretation of Fourth Amendment privacy interests). 
234 See Tokson, supra note 212, at 800. 
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little protection for most forms of digital information.235   
Such a rule would expose a vast swath of personal data to government 
observation, at least until legislatures acted to fill in the gaps.236  It would also 
enact a substantial institutional shift, largely transferring responsibility for 
privacy protection against government officials from courts to legislatures, 
and from the Constitution to statutory law.  The effects of such a transition 
are difficult to predict but would likely result in diminished protection 
against government surveillance.237 
4. Alternative Interpretations of Existing Law 
a) Empirically Measuring Expectations  
Instead of replacing the reasonable expectation of privacy test, courts 
might reinterpret it to make its application more coherent and predictable.  
 
235 The contents of emails and text messages probably would be protected under a historical 
approach.  See Bellin, supra note 230, at 279–80.  Although service providers often have 
access to such documents, they are generally stored on behalf of the user and are likely to 
be considered “their . . . papers.”  Id. at 280.  However, the government could subpoena a 
person’s emails from their recipients without violating the person’s Fourth Amendment 
rights under this approach.  See id. 
Some theories grounded in text and history would go in another direction, requiring 
a warrant for nearly every type of information recorded on paper.  Laura Donohue has 
proposed that courts could find that an individual has a property right and thus a Fourth 
Amendment right in records that exist due to the individual’s actions.  Donohue, supra 
note 63, at 353.  The idea of owning another person’s records on the basis that those 
records reflect information about one’s life would allow for sweeping Fourth Amendment 
protection but would likely require a substantial restructuring of current property 
doctrines.  Cf. id. at 400 (suggesting that granting individuals ownership in information 
generated about them may not comport with current or historical bailment law). 
236 Bellin, supra note 230, at 243. 
237 Legislatures may struggle to do so quickly or effectively, given the various institutional 
barriers to comprehensive privacy legislation.  See, e.g., FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., 
LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE 24–26, 45 (2009).  They might also simply not be 
interested in erecting new barriers to government surveillance.  Historically, legislatures 
have been largely ineffective in regulating government surveillance of electronic 
information.  See Tokson, supra note 50, at 193–94.  Further, in the decades before the 
Supreme Court held that wiretapping was unconstitutional, Congress was ineffective in 
preventing widespread wiretapping and egregious government misuses of the recorded 
conversations.  See Tokson, supra note 212, at 798, 799 n.340. 
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Several scholars have argued that surveys assessing people’s expectations of 
privacy should play an important role in determining the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment.238  These scholars would interpret the reasonable expectation 
of privacy standard more literally than the Supreme Court has to date.239  
Under this interpretation, empirical evidence indicating that Americans 
expect privacy in a given form of information against government 
surveillance would weigh heavily in favor of Fourth Amendment 
protection.240 
A survey-based approach to the Fourth Amendment’s scope would be 
conceptually straightforward and, based on existing surveys, would produce 
fairly clear answers.241  There are now several high-quality surveys of privacy 
expectations available.242  That said, an approach that turns on people’s literal 
 
238 See, e.g., Bernard Chao et al., Why Courts Fail to Protect Privacy: Race, Age, Bias, and 
Technology, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 276–77 (2018); Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob 
Strahilevitz, Actual Expectations of Privacy, Fourth Amendment Doctrine, and the Mosaic 
Theory, 6 SUP. CT. REV. 205, 226−28 (2015); Christine S. Scott-Hayward et al., Does 
Privacy Require Secrecy? Societal Expectations of Privacy in the Digital Age, 43 AM. J. CRIM. 
L. 19, 46 (2015).  These scholars do not propose wholly substituting empirical evidence 
for the existing reasonable expectation of privacy test, but rather that such evidence would 
play a pivotal role in cases where the Court determines that probabilistic expectations 
should determine the Fourth Amendment’s scope.  E.g., Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra, at 
222−23 (integrating survey evidence into existing theories of the reasonable expectation of 
privacy test).  Still, most of these scholars appear to contemplate a robust, even 
determinative role for survey evidence in Fourth Amendment search law.  See id. at 228 
(contending that a public-opinion-focused Fourth Amendment test is normatively 
desirable); Chao et al., supra, at 276 (arguing that “the most natural reading of the Katz 
reasonable expectations of privacy test” is one that consults surveys of Americans); 
Scott-Hayward et al., supra, at 46 (“[W]hat constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy 
by societal standards poses an empirical question.” (emphasis omittd)). 
239 See Tokson, supra note 11, at 49 (discussing Hudson v. Palmer and the Court’s overt 
rejection of a literal reasonable expectation of privacy inquiry); cf. supra note 238 and 
accompanying text (arguing for a literal, empirical definition of expectations of privacy). 
240 Chao et al., supra note 238, at 276; Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 238, at 228. 
241 See Chao et al., supra note 238, at 300−01 tbl.2 (reporting that overwhelming majorities 
of respondents found a violation of reasonable expectations of privacy for scenarios 
including GPS tracking, cloud document searches, drone surveillance, and email 
metadata).  Both Kugler and Strahilevitz, supra note 238, at 246, 260 tbl.9, and Chao et 
al., supra note 238, at 298 fig.1, show that a majority of respondents considered location 
tracking to violate a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
242 See, e.g., Chao et al., supra note 238, at 298−302; Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 238, 
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expectations of privacy is vulnerable to government manipulation and subject 
to change over time.243  In addition, surveys of expectations about novel or 
largely unknown forms of surveillance may not produce meaningful results. 
Evidence from existing surveys generally supports protecting electronic 
data disclosed to third parties.  Respondents have indicated that they expect 
privacy in their cell phone location data,244 emails,245 websurfing data,246 
cloud documents,247 Google maps data,248 and more.249  However, particular 
results may vary based on question phrasing and the details of the surveillance 
scenarios that pollsters create.250  Respondents were less likely to report 
expectations of privacy when hypothetical surveillance conduct was directed 
at another person rather than themselves.251  And they were much less likely 
to report expectations of privacy when the hypothetical surveillance yielded 
useful evidence.252  Even with these caveats, existing survey evidence suggests 
that people expect privacy in electronic data exposed to third parties in many 
scenarios.253 
b) Intimacy, Amount, and Cost 
Finally, the Supreme Court could interpret the reasonable expectation 
of privacy test to depend on three factors discussed in Carpenter and other 
cases—the intimacy of the thing searched, the amount of information 
 
at 246−60; Scott-Hayward et al., supra note 238, at 52−58; Christopher Slobogin, 
Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 335 (2008); 
Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and 
Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized 
and Permitted by Society”, 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 732 (1993). 
243 Solove, supra note 211, at 1522–24. 
244 Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 238, at 246. 
245 Id. at 260 tbl.9. 
246 Chao et al., supra note 238, at 298 fig.1. 
247 Id. 
248 Id. 
249 Id.; Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 238, at 260. 
250 E.g., Chao et al., supra note 238, at 298−299 (discussing biases observed in the study’s 
survey results). 
251 Id. at 298−299; Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 242, at 759–61. 
252 Chao et al., supra note 238, at 298−299. 
253 Id. at 298 fig.1. 
DRAFT - Forthcoming, 105 Cornell Law Review __ (2021) 
  
50 
obtained, and the cost of the surveillance practice.254  This doctrinal shift 
finds support in the Court’s Fourth Amendment precedents, which are nearly 
always decided in accord with the intimacy, amount, and cost of the 
surveillance at issue.255  The Court has overtly addressed these factors in many 
cases and appears to implicitly rely on them in others.256  By contrast, other 
factors such as disclosure to third parties or inescapability have had little to 
no influence on the outcomes of the Court’s cases.257 
The Court could expressly adopt this approach, holding that the 
intimacy, amount, and cost of surveillance will dictate whether it violates a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.258  This framework is relatively easy to 
 
254 Tokson, supra note 11 (manuscript at 2–3).  In general, the more intimate the place or 
thing targeted by surveillance, the more likely it is to violate reasonable expectations of 
privacy.  The greater the amount of information sought, the more likely it is to violate 
reasonable expectations of privacy.  Conversely, the more costly the investigation, the less 
likely it is to violate reasonable expectations of privacy.  Id. 
255 Id. 
256 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429−30 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (discussing the large amount of data gathered and low cost of long-duration 
GPS surveillance of a car); id. at 415−16 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (discussing the 
intimacy, amount, and cost associated with GPS surveillance of a car); Kyllo v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (“In the home, our cases show, all details are intimate 
details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.” (emphasis 
omitted)); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 446 (1989) (“[T]here is no evidence . . . that 
intimate details connected with the use of the home or curtilage were observed . . . .”); 
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 302 (1987) (concluding that police could visually 
inspect a barn because they “possessed objective data indicating that the barn was not being 
used for intimate activities of the home”); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 
238 (1986) (holding that the surveillance of commercial property via airplane-mounted 
camera was not a Fourth Amendment search because the “photographs here are not so 
revealing of intimate details as to raise constitutional concerns”); Oliver v. United States, 
466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) (“[O]pen fields do not provide the setting for those intimate 
activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference or 
surveillance.  There is no societal interest in protecting the privacy of those activities, such 
as the cultivation of crops, that occur in open fields.”); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 
696, 707 (1983) (noting the limited amount of information disclosed by a drug dog sniff); 
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283 (1983) (discussing the possibility of 
“twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen”).  
257 See Tokson, supra note 97. 
258 It might apply this on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with its existing precedents.  
Tokson, supra note 11, at 43.  Or it may focus on the potential for new surveillance 
technologies to gather large volumes of data at low cost, rather than analyzing the 
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apply and fairly effective at capturing the harms of pervasive surveillance.259  
As for drawbacks, this approach is largely intuitive and non-specific, and may 
be vulnerable to changes in surveillance practices over time.260 
Its application to digital records held by third parties may vary 
depending on the facts of the case, but in general it would offer strong 
protection for digital information.  Government requests for data stored in 
third-party databases generally involve obtaining large amounts of personal 
data at low cost.261  In many contexts, such as smart homes and devices, 
websurfing, search terms, television and streaming data, ride-sharing services, 
dating apps, and more, an approach focused on intimacy, amount, and cost 
would require the government to obtain a warrant before collecting people’s 
information.262 
Inescapability is not inevitable as a Fourth Amendment standard.  There 
are several viable alternatives for applying the Fourth Amendment in the 
digital age.  While these alternatives have their own drawbacks, most of them 
offer more protection for personal data, and a more coherent standard, than 
inescapability. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has analyzed the concept of inescapable surveillance and 
challenged the prevailing wisdom that it should be a determinant of Fourth 
Amendment protection.  Inescapabilty is difficult to apply, inequitable in its 
treatment of disadvantaged groups, ineffective in its protection of sensitive 
data, and poorly designed to incentivize beneficial behavior by consumers.  
 
circumstances of the particular case.  David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to 
Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 71–72 (2013).  This approach would broadly 
protect virtually all forms of digital information and would be relatively easy to apply, 
though it risks restraining event-driven or minimal police investigations of non-intimate 
data. 
259 Tokson, supra note 11, at 43.   
260 Id. at 43–44. 
261 Gray & Citron, supra note 258, at 114. 
262 See Tokson, supra note 11, at 47 (discussing several of these technologies and assessing 
the likely intimacy, amount, and cost associated with associated surveillance practices). 
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In light of inescapability’s conceptual, practical, and normative flaws, lower 
courts should avoid its use in future Fourth Amendment cases.  Courts 
should focus instead on the revealing and extensive nature of the government 
surveillance at issue.  These were the factors that drove the result in Carpenter, 
and they should set the path of Fourth Amendment law in the near term. 
Going forward, the Supreme Court should consider whether the time 
has come to adopt a new paradigm for Fourth Amendment law in the digital 
age.  There are several alternatives that avoid relying on inescapability and 
that may be more effective than the current test.  Even if it retains the existing 
framework, the Court should reject inescapability as a measure of 
constitutional protection.  An inescapability standard threatens to eliminate 
privacy rights in a wide variety of personal data.  There is still time to choose 
a better path for Fourth Amendment law. 
